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Abstract
Emotion regulation is crucially involved in individuals’ psychological health. For
example, the frequent use of cognitive reappraisal, or changing the way one thinks about
an emotional event, is positively associated with psychological health. Recent crosssectional findings have shown that the ability to use cognitive reappraisal (cognitive
reappraisal ability; CRA) is associated with lower depression in the context of high stress.
However, two important questions about CRA remain unexamined: 1) Does CRA predict
long-term adjustment to stress? 2) Do the protective effects of CRA depend upon the type
of stress encountered? To examine these questions, a community sample of men and
women (n=181) who had recently experienced a stressful life event was recruited and a
prospective longitudinal design was employed. Life stress severity, stressor
controllability, and depressive symptoms were measured at Time 1 and at Time 2 (6
months later). CRA was measured using a multi-method laboratory challenge at Time 1.
The results of Question 1 revealed a significant prospective relationship in which CRA
interacted with changes in life stress to predict changes in depression between Time 1 and
Time 2. Specifically, among individuals with greater increases in stress, those with high
CRA reported significantly smaller increases in depressive symptoms relative to those
with low CRA. For Question 2, results indicated that the protective effects of CRA
ii

depend upon the stressors’ controllability. Specifically, in highly stressful contexts that
were uncontrollable, the protective effects of CRA remained, such that high CRA was
associated with lower levels of depressive symptoms. In highly stressful contexts that
were controllable, the protective effects of CRA were reversed, such that high CRA was
associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms. Thus, CRA appears to be adaptive
in uncontrollable but maladaptive in controllable stressful contexts. Overall, these results
suggest that, for highly stressed individuals, CRA is an important protective factor
against long-term increases in depression. Importantly, however, these protective effects
depend upon the type of stressful context encountered. These results have important
implications for understanding how emotion regulation ability contributes to risk and
resilience in the face of stress, for clinical interventions and prevention programs, and for
understanding what constitutes adaptive emotion regulation across contexts.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Humans are emotional beings. In many situations, emotions -- even intense ones
-- can be adaptive: they allow us to avoid or escape threats in the environment, to take
advantage of resources that may aid our survival, and to function socially (Ellsworth &
Smith, 1988; Izard, 1977; Keltner & Kring, 1998). In some situations, however, emotions
may be maladaptive. For instance, feelings of intense anxiety may prevent someone from
delivering an effective presentation, or feelings of extreme anger may negatively affect
performance in the workplace. In such cases, it is often more adaptive to regulate our
emotions. Emotion regulation involves the use of behavioral and cognitive strategies to
change the duration and/or intensity of an emotion (Gross & Thompson, 2007). Although
human beings have likely engaged in emotion regulation since antiquity, this topic was
not heavily studied using empirical methods until the twentieth century. The 1990’s in
particular saw a tremendous increase in research on emotion regulation, and the field has
continued to grow. According to the online database PsycInfo, over 1400 articles listing
“emotion regulation” as keywords have been published since 1999 (search conducted
April 1, 2012).
Scientific interest in this topic may be due to the fact that emotion regulation is a
common phenomenon in people’s lives – in modern society, humans encounter a wide
range of situations that require some form of emotion regulation. Failure to effectively
regulate emotions could have devastating consequences for psychological health. In
1

addition, individuals have a large number of different emotion regulation strategies to
choose from (for reviews see Gross & Thompson, 2007; Koole, 2009) and each unique
strategy appears to have a different profile of consequences in terms of benefits (e.g.,
decreases in the experience of unwanted emotions) and costs (e.g., maladaptive
physiological responding or impaired social functioning). This repertoire of possible
emotion regulation strategies includes strategies focused on changing behavior (e.g.,
suppression), attention (e.g., attention control, distraction), cognitions (e.g., cognitive
reappraisal, acceptance), and physiological reactions (e.g., deep breathing techniques).
With such a wide variety of emotion regulation strategies at one’s disposal, it is
important to engage in strategies that are both effective and adaptive when used.
Throughout this paper, I define “effective” as an emotion regulation strategy that allows
individuals to change their subjective experience of emotions in the desired direction
without experiencing short-term costs. That is, effective emotion regulation strategies
allow individuals to change their subjective experience of emotion without any
detrimental physiological, social, or cognitive side effects. In contrast, I define “adaptive”
emotion regulation strategies as strategies that contribute to longer-term beneficial
psychological health outcomes. Based on both theoretical and empirical considerations, I
will focus on one specific emotion regulation strategy that appears to be both effective in
terms of allowing people to manage their emotions, and adaptive in terms of leading to
positive psychological outcomes: cognitive reappraisal. This strategy has been defined as
reframing the way one thinks about a stimulus in order to change its emotional impact
(Gross & Thompson, 2007).
2

Reappraisal is Effective
The question of what constitutes effective emotion regulation may be best
approached from the perspective of appraisal theory. The importance of appraisals in the
generation and regulation of emotion has been written about and discussed for thousands
of years, starting with philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle (cf. Schorr, 2001).
Specifically, the Platonic view holds that emotions are weaknesses that occur outside of
people’s control and are antithetical to logic and reason. In other words, emotions simply
happen without any regard to specific appraisals of the world around us (Lazarus, 2001).
Aristotle argued, in contrast, that emotions are simply reflections of judgments and
beliefs about the world – in other words, emotions are rooted in reason. Because people
can control their judgments and beliefs, he argued, they can also control their emotions
(Aristotle, 1941). This emphasis on evaluations as elicitors of emotion is in contrast to
theories of emotion that have hypothesized that events themselves automatically elicit
emotion (Watson, 1919), perhaps through automatically generated patterns of
physiological arousal (James, 1890; Lindsley, 1951).
Inspired by the Aristotelian view of emotions, modern-day appraisal theorists
have broadly defined appraisals as the meaning and significance a person assigns to an
event or stimulus in the environment and are influenced by a person’s current goals or
needs (Roseman & Smith, 2001). Broadly, appraisal theorists believe that “the way we
evaluate an event determines how we react emotionally” (Lazarus, 1999, p. 87). Thus, a
person’s appraisal of an event, not the event itself, causes an emotional reaction (Lazarus,
1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). In this way,
3

appraisal theory can explain the observation that the same event can lead to divergent
emotional responses for different individuals.
Further, specific appraisals of an event should lead to the experience of specific
emotions. For example, Lazarus theorized that events appraised as a loss are associated
with the experience of sadness, while events appraised as a threat are associated with the
experience of anger or fear (Lazarus, 1991). Research on appraisals supports Lazarus’
argument -- people exposed to comparable events, either in the laboratory or in a
naturalistic setting, display a wide variety of emotional reactions depending on their
specific appraisals of the event (Folkman & Lazarus, 1985; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997;
Siemer, Mauss, & Gross, 2007; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Conversely, individuals faced
with very different events may experience the same emotional reactions if they engage in
the same pattern of appraisals. For example, completely different events such as a
breakup and a job loss could both lead to feelings of sadness if they are both appraised as
losses, or could lead to feelings of relief and happiness if they are appraised as beneficial
(Roseman & Smith, 2001).
Within this theoretical framework, then, appraisals are of critical importance in
the emotion generation process. Thus, emotion regulation strategies that target appraisals
should be particularly effective because these strategies would change the underlying
cause of the emotion itself. Without a change to the underlying appraisal, however, it
should be much more difficult to change the experience of an emotion because the
existing cause of the emotion will persist. With this theoretical framework in mind,
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cognitive reappraisal should be a particularly effective strategy because, by definition, it
directly targets appraisals.
Cross-sectional laboratory studies have supported this hypothesis. Specifically, it
has been shown that the use of cognitive reappraisal is effective in two important ways.
First, cognitive reappraisal is associated with the successful down-regulation of negative
emotions and second, the use of reappraisal is not associated with negative “side effects.”
For example, Gross (1998) showed disgusting film clips to undergraduates and asked
them to either reappraise their emotions, suppress their emotions, or simply watch the
film. Results indicated that participants who suppressed their reactions to the film were
able to decrease their outward expressions of disgust, but still experienced the same
amount of disgust as those who simply watched the film. Those who suppressed their
emotional responses also experienced more peripheral physiological responding than the
reappraisal or control groups. In contrast, the group that reappraised had no significant
increase in physiological responding and reported experiencing less disgust. Several other
laboratory studies that have induced other negative emotions have found the same pattern
of results: the use of reappraisal is associated with decreases in the experience of negative
emotion without any increases in maladaptive physiological responding (Dandoy &
Goldstein, 1990; Egloff, Schmukle, Burns, & Schwerdtfeger, 2006; Jackson, Malmstadt,
Larson, & Davidson, 2000; Lazarus, Opton, Nomikos, & Rankin, 1965). Subsequent
studies have found that cognitive reappraisal has no negative effects on memory for
emotional events (Egloff et al., 2006; Richards & Gross, 2000) or social functioning
(Butler, Egloff, Wilhelm, Smith, Erickson, & Gross, 2003; Lopes, Salovey, Cote, &
5

Beers, 2005), while other types of emotion regulation do. Thus, reappraisal seems to be a
particularly effective emotion regulation strategy – it leads to decreases in the experience
of negative emotion, but those who use it do not pay any physiological, cognitive, or
social price.
Subsequent studies have illustrated that, in addition to down-regulating negative
emotions, reappraisal can also be used to increase the experience of positive emotions.
For example, Mauss and colleagues (Mauss, Cook, Cheng, & Gross, 2007) found that
individuals who reported frequently using reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy
experienced less anger and less maladaptive physiological responding in a laboratory
anger induction than those who did not report using reappraisal frequently. In addition,
the frequent reappraisers reported experiencing more positive emotions during the anger
task. Similarly, Haga and colleagues (Haga, Kraft, & Corby, 2009) found that the selfreported use of reappraisal was associated with both lower levels of negative affect as
well as higher levels of positive affect. This lends support to the idea that reappraisal can
be used effectively to decrease unwanted negative emotions, as well as to increase the
experience of positive emotions.
Overall then, cognitive reappraisal appears to provide a very effective way to
regulate emotions. People can use it to either down-regulate unwanted negative emotions,
or to up-regulate positive emotions. In addition, those who engage in cognitive
reappraisal do not appear to experience unwanted physiological, behavioral, or social
costs.

6

Reappraisal is Adaptive
As illustrated above, cognitive reappraisal appears to be very effective for
regulating emotions. In addition, cognitive reappraisal also appears to be adaptive – its
use is associated with beneficial long-term psychological health outcomes. Broadly, I use
the term “psychological health” to refer to greater positive (e.g., well-being, satisfaction
with life) as well as lower negative (e.g., depression, anxiety) psychological health
outcomes. Below, I review empirical evidence that supports the hypothesis that the use of
reappraisal is associated with both of these facets of psychological health.
Reappraisal and psychological health. Few studies have examined the role of
reappraisal and psychological health outcomes in healthy populations. The small number
of studies that have been conducted, however, seem to converge on a common pattern.
For example, Gross and John (2003; John & Gross, 2004) have examined the relationship
between cognitive reappraisal use and positive outcomes over time. They found that the
use of cognitive reappraisal, as measured with a self-report trait measure, was associated
with greater overall levels of well-being, including measures of self-esteem, life
satisfaction, and optimism. Haga et al (2009) similarly found that the use of CR was
associated with higher levels of satisfaction with life in an international sample of
undergraduates. These studies suggest that there are individual differences in daily
reappraisal use, and that those who report using cognitive reappraisal are more likely to
experience increased psychological health.
A large body of research has also examined the role of reappraisal use and
decreases in negative psychological health outcomes. In several studies, Garnefski and
7

colleagues have found a robust negative relationship between self-reported use of
reappraisal and depression (Garnefski, Baan, & Kraaij, 2005; Garnefski, Boon, & Kraaij,
2003; Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001; Garnefski & Kraaij, 2006). In a longitudinal
study using a sample of older adults, the negative relationship between cognitive
reappraisal and depression was replicated at a two and a half year follow-up session,
which suggests that this relationship persists over time (Kraaij, Pruymboom, &
Garnefski, 2002). The self-reported use of cognitive reappraisal is also associated with
less trait anxiety (Egloff et al., 2006). Indeed, a recent meta-analysis found that selfreported reappraisal use (in both clinical and non-clinical samples) is associated with
fewer symptoms of depression and anxiety, which suggests that the link between
reappraisal and these two outcomes is robust (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer,
2010). In addition, the use of reappraisal has been associated with fewer symptoms of
acute stress disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (Bryant, Moulds, & Guthrie,
2001; Fairbank, Hansen, & Fitterling, 1991). Taken together, these studies suggest that
there is a robust association between self-reported reappraisal use and decreased negative
psychological health outcomes such as depression. Specifically, those who report
frequently engaging in reappraisal are less likely to experience a range of psychological
health problems.
Reappraisal in the context of stress. The studies reviewed so far have examined
the main effect between reappraisal use and psychological health. However, the use of
reappraisal should be particularly important in one specific context – that of high life
stress. That is, reappraisal may act as an important protective factor against negative
8

outcomes by supplying an effective way to manage the negative emotions that
accompany stress.
Exposure to stressful life events is associated with increased risk for a host of
negative outcomes, including negative physical health outcomes (Feldman, Bensing, &
deRuijter, 2007; Koh, Choe, Song, & Lee, 2006; Miller & Blackwell, 2006) and a host of
negative psychological health outcomes including depression (Caspi, Sugden, Moffitt,
Taylor, Craig, Harrington, et al., 2003; Hawley, Ho, Zuroff, & Blatt, 2007; Monroe,
Slavich, Torres, & Gotlib, 2007; Tennant, 2002), anxiety (Tsoory, Cohen, & RichterLevin, 2007), and post-traumatic stress disorder (Brewin & Holmes, 2003). Importantly,
however, this is only true on average. Indeed, most people who are exposed to stressful
life events do not exhibit any of these unwanted consequences. In a recent study, for
example, 60% of people who had recently experienced traumatic injury displayed low
levels of depressive symptomatology over a six month period (deRoon-Cassini, Mancini,
Rusch, & Bonanno, 2010). These results are in line with existing evidence that has shown
that the majority of people exposed to very serious stressful events such as the death of a
loved one can be characterized as resilient – that is, even after exposure to severe stress
or trauma, most people maintain normal levels of psychological functioning (Bonanno,
2004; 2005; Ong, Bergeman, Bisconti, & Wallace, 2006). Impressively, many people
even experience positive outcomes or personal growth after stress exposure (Park, MillsBaxter, & Fenster, 2005; Woodward & Joseph, 2003).
These findings raise an important question: Could the use of cognitive reappraisal
be a particularly important contributor to psychological health in the context of high
9

stress? Recently, there has been increasing interest in emotion regulation as a critical
contributor to resilience in the context of stress (for a review see Troy & Mauss, 2011).
This increased interest may be due to the finding that the experience of stress is
inherently emotional – exposure to stress tends to lead to increases in negative emotions
(Feldman, Cohen, Lepore, Matthews, Kamarck, & Marsland, 1999). From this
perspective then, unregulated negative emotions may serve as an important mediator of
the relationship between stress and psychological health problems. Within this
framework then, those individuals who can effectively regulate their emotions using a
strategy like cognitive reappraisal may be protected against psychological health
problems in the context of stress by directly targeting and regulating this increase in
negative emotions (Troy & Mauss, 2011). Specifically, the use of positive reappraisal,
which consists of reframing emotional events in a more positive light, may be a
particularly adaptive strategy in the context of high stress (Troy et al., 2010).
Several studies on positive reappraisal in highly stressed populations provide
initial support for this hypothesis. For example, in a sample of highly stressed people
caring for patients with Multiple Sclerosis, Pakenham (2005) found that the self-reported
use of reappraisal was associated with a lower incidence of negative psychological health
outcomes. Similar results have been found in patient populations with chronic medical
problems (van der Veek, Kraaij, Van Koppen, Garnefski, & Joekes, 2007; Young &
McNicoll, 1998) and individuals exposed to trauma (Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt,
2008). Additionally, Folkman & Moskowitz (2000a) noted that among caregivers for
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AIDS patients, those who frequently engaged in cognitive reappraisal experienced more
positive emotions both during care giving and after the death of the patient.
Extending these findings by using an experimental intervention in a sample of
HIV positive men, Carrico and colleagues examined the moderating effects of a
cognitive-behavioral stress management (CBSM) intervention on the relationship
between stress and depression (Carrico, Antoni, Weaver, Lechner, & Schneiderman,
2005). Over the ten-week treatment period, the men who received the CBSM intervention
showed significant decreases in depressive symptomatology, and this decrease was
mediated by self-reported increases in the use of reappraisal, which suggests that the use
of reappraisal may have been the mechanism of change in these patients. A subsequent
study administered an internet based intervention for individuals experiencing
complicated grief (Wagner, Knaevelsrud, & Maercker, 2007). Importantly, one of the
three modules was dedicated solely to cognitive reappraisal exercises. At the end of the
5-week treatment period, those in the intervention group reported lower levels of
depression and anxiety symptoms, and increases in post-traumatic growth relative to the
wait-list control group (Wagner et al., 2007).
All of these studies converge on the conclusion that the use of cognitive reappraisal in
highly stressful circumstances is associated with better psychological health outcomes.
Thus, these studies support the hypothesis that the use of cognitive reappraisal could
serve as a critical protective factor against psychological health problems, and that this
protective function may be particularly important in highly stressful, relative to less
stressful, contexts.
11

The Importance of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability
While the literature reviewed above is critical in providing insight into the
effectiveness and adaptiveness of cognitive reappraisal, many important open questions
remain. One particularly important area of inquiry is related to the fact that nearly all of
the research on this topic to date has relied on self-report trait measures of cognitive
reappraisal use in daily life. The most commonly used self-report measure is the
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ), a 10-item questionnaire in which individuals
are asked to report how frequently they use cognitive reappraisal and suppression to
regulate their emotions (John & Gross, 2003). The ERQ has shown high reliability (John
& Gross, 2003), and, as shown above, is associated with increased psychological health.
There are, however, several possible limitations that could be associated with self-reports
of reappraisal use.
First, previous research has shown that retrospective self-report measures are
subject to social desirability and self-presentational biases (Schwarz, 1999). For this
reason, measures like the ERQ may over-estimate how frequently reappraisal is used.
Additionally, more recent research has found that retrospective self-reports of emotion
regulation are prone to biases caused by one’s current emotional state (Wilhelm &
Grossman, 2010), or by personality factors such as self-esteem (Robinson & Feldman
Barrett, 2010). Overall then, retrospective self-reports of emotion regulation use may not
be entirely accurate due to reporting biases.
In addition to these reporting biases, it may also be that many individuals cannot
accurately introspect upon their use of emotion regulation strategies (cf. Todd, Tennen,
12

Carney, Armeli, & Affleck, 2004). For example, there is a growing body of evidence that
many aspects of emotion regulation operate on an implicit level, below the level of
conscious awareness (Hopp, Troy, & Mauss, 2011; Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross,
2006). Additionally, van Reekum and colleagues (van Reekum, Johnstone, Urry, Thurow,
Schaefer, Alexander, et al., 2007) found that the effects of reappraisal instructions on
neural activation were significantly reduced when they accounted for eye gaze behavior.
Thus, although participants were instructed to use reappraisal, many individuals appeared
to instead be using attentional deployment strategies to change their emotions by, for
example, averting their eyes from negative images. These results suggest that some
individuals may simply not understand the definition of reappraisal, or may be unable to
use reappraisal effectively. If this is the case, it would be unreasonable to ask people to
report on the use of this strategy.
In addition to the limitations associated with self-report measures described
above, it remains unclear what construct(s) the ERQ and similar measures are truly
measuring. For instance, the face validity of the items on the ERQ suggests that it
measures frequency of reappraisal use in daily life (e.g., “When I want to feel less
negative emotion, I change the way I’m thinking about the situation.”). It is possible,
however, that individuals’ answers on the ERQ capture other facets of reappraisal such as
motivation and desire to use reappraisal, or the ability to use reappraisal. In this way, the
ERQ may be collapsing several different facets of reappraisal into one measure.
If the ERQ is indeed collapsing across several different facets of cognitive
reappraisal, existing research using this measure does not allow conclusions to be drawn
13

about the nature of these different facets or how they may relate to psychological health.
It may be, for instance, that the frequency of reappraisal use predicts psychological health
outcomes differently than the motivation or the ability to use reappraisal. Although many
potential facets of reappraisal could be studied, one facet stands out as being theoretically
important in terms of long-term resilience: ability. That is, individuals’ actual ability to
successfully change their experience of unwanted emotions may contribute to positive
psychological health outcomes. Further, the ability to use reappraisal may be a
particularly important predictor of psychological health in contexts that are highly
emotionally charged, such as high stress contexts. In this way, individuals high in
reappraisal ability could effectively down-regulate their negative emotions by changing
the appraisals that cause them.
Indeed, Kashdan and Rottenberg (2010) have suggested that a person’s ability to
flexibly use effective regulation strategies as required by situational demands is a
particularly important contributor to psychological health. In support of this hypothesis,
Bonanno (2004) has found that the ability to flexibly express or suppress emotional
expressions is a long-term predictor of resilience in the face of severe stress. Although
this work focused only on the regulation of behavior and not of subjective emotional
experience, it is important in suggesting that emotion regulation ability may be an
important predictor of psychological health. Thus, reappraisal ability may uniquely
predict mental health outcomes over and above other facets of reappraisal in the context
of high stress.
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To begin testing the hypothesis that ability may be a particularly important facet
of cognitive reappraisal, recent work has focused specifically on measuring cognitive
reappraisal ability (CRA). That is, instead of using self-reported use, this research has
used laboratory measures of emotional responding to gage how successful individuals are
when they attempt to use reappraisal to change their subjective experience of emotion.
For example, Wager and colleagues were among the first researchers to develop a
measure of CRA (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). They showed
participants in an fMRI study negative pictures and instructed participants to just look at
half of the pictures and to use reappraisal while viewing the other half of the pictures.
CRA was operationalized as the decrease in self-reported negative emotion from the just
watch condition to the reappraisal condition. Using a similar paradigm, McRae and
colleagues (McRae, Jacobs, Ray, John, & Gross, 2012) found that performance on a
laboratory challenge measure of CRA was empirically distinct from self-reported
reappraisal use, supporting the hypothesis that the frequency of using reappraisal and the
ability to use reappraisal are separate constructs.
Similarly, Shiota and Levenson (2009) used disgusting and sad film clips to
induce emotions in the laboratory. They experimentally manipulated the use of
reappraisal by instructing participants to use positive reappraisal during some of the film
clips. CRA was indexed by changes in self-reported subjective emotional response, as
well as physiological and behavioral response. Shiota and Levenson also measured selfreported reappraisal ability. Results indicated that self-reported ability was not strongly
correlated with actual ability as measured by the laboratory paradigm. There was also a
15

high degree of variability in reappraisal ability across individuals. This study provides
support for the idea that people are not able to accurately report on their ability to use
reappraisal and highlights the importance of using laboratory paradigms for providing
accurate measures of reappraisal ability.
Building upon Shiota and Levenson’s methods, Troy and colleagues (Troy,
Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010) examined how individual differences in CRA relate
to psychological health. Similar to the paradigm used by Shiota and Levenson (2009),
Troy and colleagues used film clips to induce sadness in the laboratory. During one of the
film clips, participants received instructions to use positive reappraisal. CRA was indexed
by changes in self-reported sadness and skin conductance level from the uninstructed sad
clip to the instructed sad clip. Results indicated that CRA interacted with life stress to
predict depressive symptoms. Specifically, individuals high in CRA exhibited less
depressive symptoms under high stress circumstances as compared to individuals low in
CRA. Reappraisal ability was unrelated to depression in the context of low life stress.
These results held when controlling for self-reported trait reappraisal use, which suggests
that reappraisal ability predicts depressive symptoms above and beyond self-reported use
of reappraisal.
This research is an important first step in investigating how people’s ability to
change their emotional states using reappraisal relates to psychological health outcomes.
Its results suggest that CRA may be an important protective factor against negative
outcomes such as depression, particularly among highly stressed populations. It may be
that CRA is particularly important in high stress contexts because it provides people with
16

an effective way to manage the negative emotions that accompany highly stressful
circumstances. These findings also suggest that the ability to use positive reappraisal
(reframing events more positively) may be a particularly adaptive process in the context
of high stress. For this reason, the present study specifically examines the ability to use
positive reappraisal. For the remainder of the paper, the term “cognitive reappraisal
ability” refers specifically to the ability to use positive reappraisal, rather than other
subtypes of reappraisal.
Taken together, the literature reviewed so far highlights four important insights
about cognitive reappraisal: 1) Cognitive reappraisal is effective – it provides a way to
successfully regulate the subjective experience of emotions without any accompanying
physiological, cognitive, or social costs, 2) The dispositional use of cognitive reappraisal
is adaptive – it is associated with better psychological health both cross-sectionally and
longitudinally, and it appears to contribute to resilience in the context of high stress, 3)
The ability to use reappraisal may be a critical contributor to psychological health over
and above the contributions of dispositional cognitive reappraisal use, 4) Cognitive
reappraisal ability may be particularly important for psychological health in highly
stressful, relative to less stressful, contexts.
However, several questions pertaining to cognitive reappraisal remain
unanswered. The current study seeks to provide answers to two particularly important
questions related to CRA, which will allow for a better understanding of how this
construct relates to psychological health over time and across contexts.
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Question One: Does Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Have Long-Term Effects On
Psychological Health?
As noted above, the construct of cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA) is fairly new
and has not been widely studied. The small amount of research that has been conducted,
however, suggests that in the immediate aftermath of a stressor, CRA is associated with
better psychological health outcomes (Troy et al., 2010). Unfortunately, however, all of
the research on CRA to date has been cross-sectional (Shiota & Levenson, 2009; Troy et
al., 2010; Wager et al., 2008). For this reason, it remains unclear whether the beneficial
cross-sectional effects of CRA on psychological health would translate into longer-term
psychological health outcomes.
Additionally, cross-sectional designs do not allow for strong causal claims. Based
on the existing findings, it is not clear that CRA causally contributes to psychological
health outcomes and not the other way around. For example, low CRA may simply be a
side-effect of elevated depression in the context of high stress. Indeed, previous research
on individuals with anxiety and mood disorders has found that these disordered
individuals are more likely to rely on maladaptive coping strategies such as suppression
or avoidance, rather than adaptive strategies like reappraisal (Betts, Gullone, & Allen,
2009; Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007). Although this line of research did not examine
CRA directly, these findings could be explained by the hypothesis that disordered
individuals are lower in CRA and are thus forced to rely on less effective regulation
strategies.
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Research that has directly measured CRA and psychological health outcomes
provides some argument against the hypothesis that low CRA is simply a side effect or a
consequence of low psychological health. First, in the study of CRA conducted by Troy
and colleagues (2010), there was no direct relationship between CRA and depression –
only the interaction between CRA and life stress was significant. Similarly, a study
conducted by Ehring and colleagues (Ehring, Fischer, Schnülle, Bösterling, & TuschenCaffier, 2008) found that recovered-depressed individuals reported high levels of
maladaptive emotion regulation relative to never-depressed individuals, which suggests
that low CRA may not simply be a side effect of one’s current depressive state. These
findings add support to the hypothesis that deficits in emotion regulation ability act as
risk factors for the development of psychopathology (Gross & Muñoz, 1995; Kring &
Werner, 2004).
While the existing cross-sectional evidence provides some support for the notion
that CRA causally contributes to improved psychological health, the current lack of
longitudinal studies does not allow for strong causal conclusions. Thus, prospective
longitudinal designs are needed in order to examine CRA as a predictor of changes in
psychological health over time. Specifically, if CRA interacts with changes in stress over
time to predict changes in depressive symptoms over time, this would support the
hypothesis that increased CRA causes decreases in depression over time, particularly for
those with larger increases in stress. That is, if individual differences in CRA precede
changes in both stress and depression, we can be more confident that CRA plays a causal
role in psychological health. In addition, longitudinal designs would provide evidence
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about the time course of the relationship between CRA and psychological health in the
context of stress.
To address these open questions, the current study used a prospective longitudinal
design in a community sample of adults who had recently been exposed to a stressful life
event. During Time 1, participants completed the laboratory measure of CRA, in addition
to self-report measures of life stress severity and depressive symptoms. Time 2 took place
six months later, and participants completed self-report measures of current depressive
symptoms and current life stress severity.
This study design includes several key elements that extend existing research.
First, the use of a large (N=181) community sample (both men and women aged 21-60)
yields highly generalizable results. Second, the sample consists of people who have been
exposed to a recent stressful life event, which will allow CRA to be measured in a
context that appears to be critically important: high stress. Third, life stress and
depressive symptoms were measured at two time points, allowing for the assessment of
change over time. Fourth, this study used the previously validated (see Troy et al., 2010)
laboratory measure of CRA rather than self-reports.
The current study tests the hypothesis that high CRA, in interaction with change
in life stress over time, is associated with greater decreases in depressive symptoms over
a six-month period. This hypothesis is examined both cross-sectionally (to replicate past
results) and longitudinally (to extend past results). The hypothesis will be supported if
individuals with higher levels of CRA and higher levels of life stress at Time 2
(controlling for life stress at Time 1) report larger decreases in depressive symptoms over
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time compared to those individuals who are high in life stress at Time 2 but low in CRA.
No differences in depressive symptoms as a function of CRA are predicted for
individuals low in life stress at Time Two.
Question Two: Is Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Maladaptive In Specific Types of
Stressful Contexts?
As discussed above, existing evidence suggests that CRA is most protective in
highly stressful contexts relative to less stressful contexts (Troy et al., 2010). Importantly,
these results were significant in a sample that included a very diverse range of stressful
life events, including sudden job loss, divorce, and experiencing the death of a close
family member. Thus, CRA may be an adaptive process across a wide range of stressful
contexts. The relative usefulness of CRA in high stress contexts may be due to the fact
that stress exposure leads to increases in negative emotion (Feldman, Cohen, Lepore,
Matthews, Kamarck, & Marsland, 1999). From this perspective, one’s ability to regulate
negative emotions is important in all highly stressful contexts because there will likely be
more negative emotions that need to be regulated effectively.
Although the protective effects of CRA appear to hold across a wide range of
stressful circumstances, there may be important exceptions to this observation. Indeed,
theorists across the social sciences have argued that no psychological process is
inherently adaptive in all contexts (Darley, 1992; Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000b;
Mischel, 1968; O’Mara, McNulty, & Karney, 2011). In addition, many personality
psychologists have emphasized the importance of person by situation interactions in
explaining human behavior (Blass, 1991; Ender & Magnusson, 1976; Murray &
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Kluckhohn, 1953). This raises the question of whether there are contexts in which CRA
may be relatively less adaptive, or may even be maladaptive (i.e., associated with
negative psychological health outcomes). What contextual factors might moderate the
adaptiveness of reappraisal? From a theoretical perspective, CRA would appear to be
more useful in stressful contexts in which it is important to change one’s emotional
reactions to a stressor. With this in mind, are there any stressful circumstances in which it
might not be critical -- or maybe even counterproductive -- to regulate one’s emotions?
Research on self-control may provide an answer to this question. Many selfcontrol researchers have made the distinction between primary and secondary control
(Heckhausen & Schulz, 1993; 1995; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982; Schulz &
Heckhausen, 1996). Heckhausen and Schulz (1995) defined primary control as “bringing
the environment into line with one’s wishes” (p. 285). Based on this definition, examples
of primary control include active problem solving such as putting out a fire in one’s home
with a fire extinguisher. Secondary control, on the other hand, involves “bringing oneself
in line with the environment” (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995, p. 285). That is, secondary
control involves making changes within oneself, often by changing one’s goals,
expectations, or cognitions, in order to cope with stress. Based on this definition,
examples of secondary control often involve attempts at emotion regulation, such as
downplaying the importance or impact of a negative event. Within this definition, then,
the use of cognitive reappraisal would be considered a secondary control strategy.
In the coping literature, the distinction between primary and secondary control is
paralleled by the distinction between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping,
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respectively (see Folkman, 1984 and Folkman & Lazarus, 1980 for reviews). For
example, Folkman (1984) defined problem-focused coping as attempting to directly
manage the problem that is causing distress through strategies such as active problem
solving, decision making, and seeking instrumental support from others. On the other
hand, Folkman defined emotion-focused coping as attempting to regulate the distress that
has been caused by using strategies like cognitive reappraisal. Indeed, Folkman (1984)
explicitly states that she considers secondary control a form of emotion-focused coping
because it involves “efforts to accommodate oneself to uncontrollable events” (Folkman,
1984, p. 844). Based on these definitions then, it appears that the use of CRA could be
considered an example of emotion-focused coping.
Importantly, Folkman (1984) notes the context in which she believes emotionfocused coping is particularly well suited: uncontrollable stress. That is, in circumstances
where an individual has no control over the stressor that is occurring, problem-focused
coping may be ineffective or even counterproductive. By engaging in emotion-focused
coping, however, an individual may be able to decrease their levels of distress and
increase “perceptions of control in ostensibly uncontrollable circumstances” (Folkman,
1984, p. 844)1.

1

Although the theoretical distinction between primary and secondary control maps on to the distinction
between problem -focused and emotion-focused coping, only the coping literature has made specific
predictions about controllable and uncontrollable contexts. For this reason, I will use the terms problemfocused and emotion-focused coping for the remainder of the paper, rather than primary and secondary
control.
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For example, consider someone who is about to lose her job because of poor
performance at work. This kind of stressor could be considered at least somewhat
controllable because this individual could attempt to improve her performance. To cope
with this stressor then, the most adaptive course of action would be to engage in problemfocused coping by, for instance, putting in longer hours at work and meeting with her
bosses to see how she can improve her performance. Engaging in emotion-focused
coping, on the other hand, would probably not be adaptive. In fact, engaging in an
emotion-focused strategy like cognitive reappraisal may even hinder her ability to engage
in problem-focused coping because this may use precious time and cognitive resources
that could otherwise be used for more active coping. In addition, if this individual is able
to successfully down-regulate her negative emotions using cognitive reappraisal, she may
no longer be motivated to engage in direct action or other forms of active coping. That is,
the presence of negative emotions in the context of controllable stressors may be
adaptive, in that they may provide the motivation to actively cope with the stressor at
hand.
Now consider a more uncontrollable circumstance – someone who is about to lose
her job due to layoffs during a difficult economic period. This context is considerably
less controllable than the first – there may be nothing this individual can do in order to
prevent the job loss. In this context then, it may be more adaptive to engage in emotionfocused coping by, for instance, attempting to reframe the situation more positively in
order to regulate her emotions and come to terms with the reality of the situation.
Engaging in problem-focused coping, however, would seem maladaptive because direct
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attempts to change the situation would most likely fail. Within this theoretical
framework, problem-focused coping would be particularly adaptive in controllable
stressful contexts and emotion-focused coping would be particularly adaptive in
uncontrollable stressful contexts.
Research using self-report checklist measures of stress and coping provides some
initial support for the idea that emotion-focused coping is more adaptive in uncontrollable
stressful contexts. In stressful circumstances perceived as uncontrollable, people are more
likely to report engaging in emotion-focused coping strategies like reappraisal, relative to
situations that are perceived as controllable (Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989;
Folkman & Lazarus, 1980). In addition, Collins, Baum, & Singer (1983) studied the
residents of Three Mile Island (survivors of an uncontrollable nuclear accident) and
found that those who reported using more emotion-focused coping in response to the
event reported lower levels of psychological distress.
In stressful situations that are uncontrollable, however, cognitive reappraisal may
be associated with worse psychological health For example, in a four-year longitudinal
study, participants with the tendency to form positive appraisals of stressful events were
significantly more depressed when they experienced severe, controllable stressors,
relative to those who experienced less severe, controllable stressors (O’Mara et al., 2011).
No studies to date, however, have examined cognitive reappraisal ability simultaneously
in both controllable and uncontrollable stressful contexts.
Based on the theoretical arguments and the literature reviewed above, CRA
appears to provide a particularly effective way to regulate emotions in the context of
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stress. Further, based on the theoretical framework described in this section, because
CRA is an emotion-focused strategy, it should be particularly protective in stressful
situations that are uncontrollable, relative to stressors that are controllable. More
specifically, CRA may be particularly well-suited to allow people to manage their
negative emotions in uncontrollable circumstances because more active forms of coping
are not possible. In the context of controllable stress, however, CRA should be less
adaptive or even maladaptive, because this context is better suited for the use of active
coping strategies, rather than emotion-focused ones.
In order to address this important question of whether the protective effects of
CRA differ depending upon the controllability of stressors that have been experienced,
the current study uses the same community sample that was described in the Question
One section above. Importantly, a measure of stressor controllability (for stressors
encountered by the participants in the community sample) was provided by a matched
sample of independent coders, which yields a relatively objective measure of stressor
controllability.
A large body of research has examined stressor controllability, which has been
defined as the degree to which “potential outcomes …can be influenced by human
actions” (Heth & Somer, 2002, p. 885). However, much of this research has used nonhuman subjects (Brown, Hurley, Repucci, & Drugan, 2001; Wellman, Cullen, &
Pelleymounter, 1998), or has experimentally manipulated stressor controllability in the
lab, rather than studying naturally occurring stressful life events (Friedland, Keinan, &
Regev, 1992; Peters, Godaert, Ballieux, van Vliet, Willemsen, Sweep, & Heijnen, 1998;
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Watanabe, Iwanaga, & Ozeki, 2002). Additionally, the small body of research that has
studied naturally occurring life events has relied on subjective self-report measures of
perceived controllability (Folkman, 1984; Puente-Diaz & Anshel, 2005; Terry, 1991).
Previous research has shown that an individual’s subjective perception of stressor
controllability can be confounded with several personality factors, including locus of
control, pessimism, and self-efficacy (Heth & Somer, 2002). Additionally, one’s
perception of controllability may be confounded with one’s ability to respond to and
actively cope with stress (Hiroto, 1974; Rosenbaum & Ben-Ari, 1985). For these reasons,
subjective ratings of controllability may yield biased or inaccurate estimates that may be
confounded with other study variables such as depression.
For this reason, I developed a relatively objective measure of stressor
controllability for the present study (see Measures section below). This measure of
controllability was collected in addition to the laboratory measure of CRA and the selfreport measures of cumulative life stress and depressive symptoms. Each of these selfreport measures was collected during the laboratory session at Time 1 and at Time 2,
which will allow for the assessment of changes in cumulative stress, stressor
controllability, and depressive symptoms over a six month period. The addition of a
measure of stressor controllability allowed me to test the hypothesis that CRA interacts
with both stress level and controllability of stress to predict depressive symptoms.
Specifically, I hypothesized that CRA will be most protective against negative outcomes
under high stress conditions that are relatively uncontrollable. In the context of relatively
controllable stress, on the other hand, I expect the protective effect of CRA to be
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diminished or even reversed, because this is a context in which CRA should be less
protective against negative outcomes. Because I expect these relationships to predict
changes in psychological health over time, I predict that this three-way interaction will be
present cross-sectionally (at Time 1), as well as prospectively (when examining changes
in cumulative stress, stressor controllability, and depressive symptoms) at Time 2.
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Chapter Two: Method
Participants
A community sample of 181 men and women between the ages of 21 and 60 participated
in this study. To qualify, all participants were required to be native English speakers and
to have experienced a stressful life event (SLE) within the past eight weeks. For the
purposes of this study, an SLE was defined as an event with a clearly defined starting
point within the past eight weeks (i.e., an acute instead of a chronic stressor) that has had
a significant, negative impact on participants’ lives. Examples of SLEs included in the
sample are: death of a spouse or close family member, injury of self or close family
member, divorce, sudden unemployment, and exposure to crime. The inclusion of many
different types of stressors allows us to study the role of cognitive reappraisal ability as a
general mechanism across a wide range of stressors and stress levels. Participants were
recruited through postings online such as Craigslist, and by posting flyers in public areas
such as laundromats, libraries, and local hospitals. The sample mirrors the racial and
ethnic makeup of the Denver Metro area. In terms of race, the sample was 85% European
American, 6% African American, 1% Asian American, and about 8% reported other or
multiple races. In terms of ethnicity, the sample was 7% Hispanic/Latino. Participants
were compensated $55 for the completion of Time 1 and $15 for the completion of Time
2.
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Procedure
The study consisted of two time points over the course of six months. Time 1 took
place within eight weeks of each participant’s SLE. Time 2 occurred six months after
Time 1. At both time points, participants completed questionnaires measuring cumulative
life stress and depressive symptoms. At the end of Time 1, the laboratory reappraisal
ability task was administered (see Appendix B, Figure 1). Participants were seated alone
in front of a computer monitor in a quiet lab room. The experimenter connected sensors
to each participant’s fingers and stomach in order to collect physiological measurements
during the task. Each participant was presented with a short (three minutes) emotionally
neutral video clip depicting scenes from a nature film. After the film clip, participants
rated the amount of 13 different emotions, including sadness, they felt during the film
clip on nine-point Likert scales in order to establish baseline levels of emotion. Next,
participants were presented with three film clips pretested to induce moderate amounts of
sadness. These clips came from the following films: Fatal Attraction, I Am Sam, and
Kramer vs. Kramer. Film clips have been widely used in previous research to induce
sadness (Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998; Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007) and are
considered more ecologically valid and more intense than still pictures or words
(Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). Each of these film clips is approximately two minutes
long, depicts a personal interaction (each of these films show two people discussing an
emotional event) and have received similar normative ratings of moderate sadness in
previous research (Troy et al., 2010).
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During two of the sad film clips, participants were simply asked to “please watch
the following film clip carefully.” During one of the sad film clips, participants were
asked to reappraise the situation they are watching in order to decrease its emotional
impact. The instructions for this condition are presented as follows:
Please watch the following film clip carefully. This time, as you watch, try
to think about the situation you see in a more positive light. You can
achieve this in several different ways. For example, try to imagine advice
that you could give to the characters in the film clip to make them feel
better. This could be advice that would help them think about the positive
bearing this event could have on their lives. Or, think about the good
things they might learn from this experience. Keep in mind that even
though a situation may be painful in the moment, in the long run, it could
make one’s life better, or have unexpected good outcomes. In other words,
try to think about the situation in as positive terms as you possibly can.
This can be difficult at times, so it is very important that you try your best.
Please ask the research assistant if you have any questions about this
task. It is very important that you carefully watch the film clip, but think
about it from a positive perspective.

These instructions are based on writing techniques used in clinical research to
encourage patients to reframe a stressful event in a more positive way. (Lange, van de
Ven, & Schrieken, 2003; Lange et al., 2003; Pennebaker & Chung, 2007). Although other
techniques have been used previously for reappraisal instructions, such as self-distancing
(Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Mischel, Downey, Peake, & Rodriguez, 2000), or denying the
reality of the event (Gross & Levenson, 1993) the reframing technique we use seems to
provide a high degree of ecological validity, and closely mirrors the definition of
cognitive reappraisal as laid out by Gross (Gross & Thompson, 2007). These instructions
also avoid explicitly telling the participant to feel less sad while reappraising, thus
avoiding potential demand characteristics in the self-report data. In addition, these
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instructions give specific examples of how one could use reappraisal while watching the
film clip. Thus, it should be more likely that each person will be able to successfully use
reappraisal when instructed to.
After the presentation of each film clip, participants were asked to report the
greatest amount of 13 different emotions, including sadness, that they experienced during
the clip. In order to account for possible habituation to the sad film clips, participants
were randomly assigned to two groups. The order of the film clips was the same for both
groups, but the order of the emotion regulation instructions differed (see Appendix B,
Figure 1). Group 1 was given instructions to reappraise on the second sad film, whereas
Group 2 was given instructions to reappraise on the third sad film. The remaining sad
films for each group served as controls. By changing the film in which participants
reappraised, I am able to account for possible habituation (decrease in sadness over each
subsequent film clip) by comparing sadness ratings on the films between groups. This
design also allows for the examination of changes within individuals. Because neither
group is reappraising during the first sad film clip, sadness ratings during this film are
used as a sadness baseline.
Measures
Life stress. The cumulative negative impact of stressful life events was measured
with the Life Experiences Survey at Time 1 and Time 2 (LES; Sarason, Johnson, &
Siegel, 1978). This measure consists of 46 items about a wide range of different stressors,
both positive (e.g. marriage) and negative (e.g. death of a spouse). Each item asks if one
has experienced a particular stressor within the past 18 months and the degree to which
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the stressor has affected you (in both positive and negative ways). The LES has been
widely used as a measure of stress in previous literature (Roth, Goode, Williams, &
Faught, 1994; Harrington, Matheny, Curlette, McCarthy, & Penick, 2005, Schmidt,
Demulder, & Denham, 2002). This measure supplies both the number of events that have
occurred in past months, as well as the sum of the perceived impact of negative events.
For the purposes of this study, we use the perceived negative impact of events occurring
in the past 18 months as our measure of cumulative life stress at Time One and Time
Two. The LES produces test-retest reliability coefficients ranging between .56 and .88 for
the negative impact scale over a five to six week time period. Responses to the LES also
appear to be relatively free of response bias (Sarason et al., 1978). The present sample
included individuals who had experienced a wide range of cumulative life stress at Time
One (M = 15.87, SD = 10.50, Range: 1 - 46) and Time Two (M = 9.82, SD = 9.33, Range:
0 - 40). For illustrative purposes, an individual who experienced 3 stressful events that
were perceived as “extremely negative” in the past 18 months would have a score of 9 on
the LES.
Stressor controllability. Previous researchers have defined stressor
controllability in a wide variety of ways (Fleming, Baum, & Singer, 1984; Folkman,
1984; Heth & Somer, 2002; Roth & Cohen, 1986). For the purposes of the present study,
I use Heth & Somer’s (2002) definition of stressor controllability, which defines this
construct as the degree to which “potential outcomes …can be influenced by human
actions” (Heth & Somer, 2002, p. 885). Using this definition, the more an individual can
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exert influence over the occurrence and outcome of a stressful event, the more control
this individual has.
As mentioned in the Question 2 section above, self report measures of stressor
controllability may be subject to confounds that may result in biased estimates of
personal control. Indeed, previous research has shown that many individuals provide
inaccurate estimates of their personal control across a wide range of contexts (Langer,
1975; Langer & Roth, 1975). Thus, it was important to develop a more objective measure
of stressor controllability that yields a relatively unbiased estimate of the controllability
of participants’ real life stressors.
To create such an objective measure, a sample of independent coders from the
community (N=22) provided ratings of the controllability of the original participants’
stressors. As shown in Appendix A Table 1, this new sample of coders was matched to
the original sample on age, sex, race, years of education, and family income. In addition,
this sample was significantly less depressed than the original sample, suggesting that the
coders’ controllability ratings were less likely to be driven by high levels of depression.
Each rater was given the definition of controllability described above, and all coders
provided ratings for all 46 possible stressors on the LES (the same measure that was used
to collect the measure of cumulative life stress, described above). Ratings were assigned
on a 1 to 4 scale, with 1 indicating a very uncontrollable event and 4 indicating a very
controllable event. Across all 22 coders, the single measure intra-class correlation
coefficient was 0.54, F(34, 680) = 28.19, p<.001, indicating a moderate degree of
reliability across coders.
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The controllability ratings from all coders were averaged to create an overall
controllability score for each item on the LES. To calculate a total stressor controllability
score for each participant in the original sample, the controllability scores for each
stressor on the LES that the participant had experienced in the past 18 months and
perceived as having a negative impact were averaged. Thus, this composite indicates the
average amount of control each participant had over the stressors they experienced in the
past 18 months. The mean controllability score for Time 1 was 2.78 (SD=.36, Range:
1.23 – 3.33) and for Time 2 it was 2.97 (SD=.39, Range: 1.27 – 3.70).
Depression symptoms. Depression symptoms were measured at Time One and
Time Two using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck & Steer, 1984). This allows
for the measurement of changes in depressive symptoms over time. The BDI is a selfreport measure consisting of 21 items. Each question consists of four grouped statements
(for example, “I do not feel sad,” “I feel sad,” “I am sad all of the time and I can’t snap
out of it,” and “I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it”). Participants are instructed to
select the item that best describes how they have felt in the past week. One question,
which pertains to suicidal thoughts, was not included in the current study, leaving a total
of 20 questions. Each item is scored on a zero to three scale and the total BDI score is
calculated by summing the scores across all items. The BDI has been shown to have
adequate internal consistency (Beck & Steer, 1984) and has been very widely used in
research to measure current depressive symptoms (Brands et al., 2007; Thombs et al.,
2007; Pearlstein, Zlotnick, Battle, Stuart, O’Hara, & Price, 2006; O’Donnell, Wardle,
Dantzer, & Steptoe, 2006). Because the current sample was, on average, highly stressed,
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average BDI scores were elevated at Time One (M = 11.85, SD = 9.83) and Time Two
(M = 11.64, SD = 10.30).
Cognitive reappraisal ability. Cognitive reappraisal ability, or the amount that
individuals are able to decrease the amount of sadness they feel when instructed to
reappraise, was measured in a laboratory paradigm at Time One. Two separate indices of
CRA were collected: changes in self-reported sadness and changes in skin conductance
level.
Self-reported sadness was measured immediately after each film clip. Participants
rated, on a nine-point Likert scale, the highest amount of 13 different emotions that were
experienced during the film that was just watched. Change scores in self-reported sadness
were calculated by subtracting sadness ratings made after the reappraised sad film from
sadness ratings made after the baseline sad film. Because the reappraisal film is not the
same for everyone, raw film ratings were converted to z-scores before the change score
for each individual was calculated. This variable is referred to as CRA-SAD. Mean
scores on CRA-SAD were 0.31 (SD = 1.02).
As in previous research (Troy et al., 2010), I decided a priori that individuals who
responded to the baseline sad film clip with no sadness (an answer of 1 on the 9 point
scale) would be excluded from all analyses. Because the baseline sadness induction failed
for these participants, their CRA scores would be difficult to interpret. 17 participants
were excluded for this reason, leaving 164 participants for analysis.
During the experimental session, physiological channels were sampled
continuously at 1000 Hz using laboratory software. Later, customized analysis software
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(Wilhelm, Grossman & Roth, 1999) was applied to physiological data reduction, artifact
control, and computation of average physiological scores for each participant for each
film clip. Although multiple physiological measures were obtained, the primary
physiological measure of interest is skin conductance level (SCL) because it has been
used previously as an indicator of CRA (Troy et al., 2010).
SCL is a measure of electrodermal activation. SCL was derived from a signal
using a constant-voltage device to pass 0.5 V between Beckman electrodes (using an
electrolyte of sodium chloride in Unibase) attached to the palmar surface of the middle
phalanges of the first and second fingers of the non-dominant hand. Skin conductance
level was indexed by the mean level after movement and electrode contact artifacts had
been edited out using a customized detection procedure (Wilhelm, Grossman & Roth,
1999). Previous research has found that increases in sadness are associated with
decreases in SCL (Kreibig, Wilhelm, Roth & Gross, 2007; Kunzmann & Gruhn, 2005;
Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2005). Based on these findings, we
believe that greater reappraisal ability will associated with increases in SCL, while a lack
of reappraisal ability will be characterized by decreases in SCL. This index of CRA is
referred to as CRA-SCL. Mean scores on CRA-SCL were -0.01 (SD = 0.55). Due to
technical problems, SCL data was not available for 20 participants. This left 134
participants available for analyses with CRA-SCL.
Possible group effects were examined to make sure that there were no significant
differences between experimental groups on either measure of CRA. T-tests revealed that
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CRA did not differ significantly between experimental groups using either index of CRA,
CRA-SAD: t(162) = 1.15, p = 0.25, or CRA-SCL: t(125) = -0.43, p = .67.
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Chapter Three: Results
Outlier Analysis
Each variable that is used in the analyses discussed below was examined for
outliers, which are defined as values greater than three times the inter-quartile range
above or below the mean (Tukey, 1977). Three variables contained outliers: Time 1
stressor controllability (n=3), Time 2 stressor controllability (n=4), and CRA-SCL (n=7).
To ensure that our results were not driven by these extreme values, these outliers were
removed for all analyses. This left a total of 161 values for analyses with Time 1 stressor
controllability, 121 values for analyses with Time 2 stressor controllability, and 127
values for analyses with CRA-SCL.
Data Analysis Strategy
For all regression analyses described below, all continuous predictors were mean
centered before calculating interaction terms and before entering effects into the models.
Manipulation Check: Sadness Induction
To confirm that the three sad film clips induced moderate amounts of sadness, I
examined mean sadness ratings for each film clip for unmanipulated (uninstructed) film
viewings (the whole sample for the first sad film, Group 2 for the second sad film, Group
1 for the third sad film). The mean (SD) sadness ratings were 6.40 (2.21; Film 1), 6.46
(2.24; Film 2), and 6.26 (2.36; Film 3). The results of paired-samples t-tests indicated that
all three sad film clips induced significantly greater reports of sadness than the neutral
39

film clip (M = 1.27, SD = 1.13, all ps < .01). In addition, each of the three film clips
induced significantly greater amounts of sadness than anger, fear, or happiness (all ps <
.01). Lastly, unmanipulated sadness ratings for Film 1 were not significantly different
from sadness ratings for Film 2, t(82)=-.10, p=.92, or Film 3, t(81)=.47, p=.64, and there
were no significant differences between Film 2 and Film 3, t(136)=.31, p=.75.
Manipulation Check: Cognitive Reappraisal Instruction
To test whether the reappraisal instructions affected sadness reports consistent
with instructions (i.e., led to lower levels of sadness on average), we conducted a
repeated measures ANOVA with film (Sad Film 2 vs. 3) as a within-individual factor and
experimental group (reappraisal instruction vs. no instruction) as a between-subjects
factor. To take into account each individual’s sadness baseline, we entered change scores
from the sad baseline to Sad Films 2 and 3, respectively. These scores are in z-units, and
a negative score indicates that the individual reported less sadness on the film in question
than on the baseline sad film. As illustrated in Appendix B Figure 2, the interaction
between film clip and experimental group was significant, F(1, 162) = 16.85, p <.01. The
differences observed between groups were in the expected directions (see Appendix B,
Figure 1): during the second sad film, when Group 1 was asked to use cognitive
reappraisal and Group 2 was just watching, Group 1 reported significantly lower levels of
sadness relative to Group 2, t(162) = -3.82, p < .01. During the third sad film clip, when
Group 2 was asked to use cognitive reappraisal and Group 1 was just watching, Group
2’s mean sadness ratings were lower than Group 1’s. This group difference, however,
was not statistically significant, t(162) = 0.64, p = .52.
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Although not all of the predicted group differences were significant, the direction
of changes in means on this task suggest that participants were attempting to use
cognitive reappraisal and at least some were succeeding in their attempts. Additionally, it
may not be surprising that the group difference on the third sad film was not significant,
given that Group 1 had been asked to reappraise on an earlier film. This group might
have persevered using cognitive reappraisal during the last film clip, resulting in lower
sadness ratings than would have otherwise been observed. Indeed, 45% of participants in
Group 1 reported that they used reappraisal during the third film clip, even though they
had not been instructed to do so.
Discriminant Validity of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability
The two indices of CRA, CRA-SAD and CRA-SCL, were not significantly
correlated with one another (r = -.10, p = .22). Therefore, I conducted separate analyses
for these two indices of CRA.
Correlations between CRA-SAD, CRA-SCL, and measures of cumulative stress,
depressive symptoms, stressor controllability, demographic variables, emotion regulation
and personality variables, emotional reactivity, and verbal intelligence are shown in
Appendix A, Table 2. As indicated in Table 2, CRA-SAD was negatively correlated with
Time 2 cumulative stress and Time 2 depressive symptoms2. CRA-SAD was also

2

Given this pattern of correlations, I also examined whether Time 2 cumulative stress mediates the
relationship between CRA-SAD and Time 2 depressive symptoms (controlling for Time 1 cumulative
stress and Time 1 depressive symptoms). The partial correlation between CRA-SAD and Time 2 depressive
symptoms, controlling for Time 2 stress, was not significant (r=-.12, p=.17), which suggests that Time 2
stress is a significant mediator. However, the Sobel Test was not significant (p>.05).
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positively correlated with family income, self-reported cognitive reappraisal ability,
social desirability, and sadness reactivity. CRA-SAD was also marginally negatively
correlated with Time 1 Depression (p = .07), and marginally positively correlated with
extraversion (p = .08). CRA-SCL showed slightly different patterns of association with
the other variables: there was a significant positive correlation with SCL reactivity, and a
marginally significant positive correlation with Time 2 depressive symptoms (p = .06).
CRA-SCL was not significantly associated with any of the other measured variables.
Independent samples t-tests confirmed that there were no significant gender differences
on either measure of CRA (both ps >.26). A series of one-way ANOVAs also showed no
significant relationship between either measure of CRA and race or ethnicity,
respectively (all ps >.32)
Discriminant Validity of Stressor Controllability
Because this is the first study to use this measure of stressor controllability, it was
important to examine how this new measure relates to other constructs. The correlation
between Time 1 and Time 2 stressor controllability was significant (r=.31, p<.01).
Correlations between controllability at both time points and measures of depressive
symptoms, life stress, CRA, demographic variables, emotion regulation and personality
factors, emotional reactivity, and verbal intelligence are shown in Appendix A, Table 3.
As shown in Table 3, Time 1 controllability was positively related to Time 1 life
stress. In addition, there was a marginally significant correlation between Time 1
controllability and Time 2 life stress (p=.10). Time 1 controllability was not significantly
correlated with any of the other measured variables. Time 2 controllability was positively
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related to extraversion, but was not significantly correlated with any of the other
measured variables.
A t-test was conducted to examine whether there were significant gender
differences in controllability scores at both time points. There were no significant gender
differences in stressor controllability at Time 1, t(159)=-1.36, p=.17. At Time 2, there
was a significant gender difference, t(115)=-2.28, p=.03, with women exhibiting higher
levels of stressor controllability (M=3.07, SD=.21) compared to men (M=2.96, SD=.32).
A series of one-way ANOVAs revealed that stressor controllability was not significantly
associated with race or ethnicity at either time point (all ps>.20). At Time 1, participants
also provided self-report ratings of how much control they thought they had over the
most stressful event they had experienced in the past three months on a 1-5 scale. These
self-report ratings at Time 1 were not significantly correlated with Time 1 stressor
controllability, r=.12, p=.12, although it is important to note that the measure of stressor
controllability assessed all negative events that had occurred in the past 18 months, rather
than just the most stressful event.
Question One: Does Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Have Long-Term Effects on
Psychological Health?
Cross-sectional effects of CRA. First, I examined the cross-sectional effects of
CRA on depressive symptoms. Depressive symptoms at Time 1 were entered as the
dependent variable, and mean centered values for CRA, Time 1 cumulative life stress,
and the interaction between the two were entered simultaneously into the regression
model. CRA-SAD and CRA-SCL were examined in two separate regression models. The
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results of these two regressions are shown in Appendix A, Table 4 and Table 5. For
CRA-SAD, there was a significant main effect of cumulative stress, but no significant
main effect of CRA-SAD, and no significant interaction between cumulative stress and
CRA-SAD. The same pattern was observed for CRA-SCL: there was a significant main
effect of cumulative stress, but no significant main effect of CRA-SCL, and no
significant interaction. Thus, the cross-sectional interaction between CRA and cumulative
stress that has been previously reported (Troy et al., 2010) was not replicated.
Secondary analyses of cross-sectional effects. A series of secondary analyses
were performed to investigate the role of trait reappraisal, age, sex, and reactivity in the
cross-sectional relationship between cumulative stress, CRA, and depressive symptoms.
For each of the secondary variables that was examined, the mean centered variable was
added as a main effect to the original regression model described above, along with all
two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction between cumulative stress, CRA, and
each control variable, respectively.
For models using CRA-SAD, when each of these models were examined, the two
way interaction between CRA-SAD and cumulative stress remained non-significant (all
ps>.10). There were, however, significant three-way interactions between CRA-SAD,
cumulative stress, and trait reappraisal, β=.13, t(156)=1.98, p=.05, CRA-SAD,
cumulative stress, and sex, β=.49, t(156)=2.15, p=.03, and CRA-SAD, cumulative stress,
and sadness reactivity, β=-.22, t(156)=-2.87, p=.005.
When plotting these three-way interactions, the pattern of the relationship
between CRA-SAD and cumulative stress in predicting depression was similar (i.e., the
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relationship was not flipped) for those who were high versus low in trait reappraisal, as
well as for both men and women. In both cases, the three-way interaction appears to be
significant because of differences in the strength of the interaction between cumulative
stress and CRA. For instance, the two-way interaction between cumulative stress and
CRA-SAD was stronger for those who were high in trait reappraisal, relative to those
who were low in trait reappraisal. Similarly, the two-way interaction between cumulative
stress and CRA was marginally significant for women (p=.08), but not significant for
men (p=.18). Because the pattern of results was not dramatically different depending
upon trait reappraisal use or sex, I did not examine these 3-way interactions further.
An examination of the three-way interaction with sadness reactivity revealed that
CRA-SAD was associated with lower levels of depression at high levels of stress for
individuals who were high in reactivity, but this protective effect was not present for
those who were low in reactivity. Although this interaction may indicate an interesting
phenomenon, it does not appear to be a general pattern across measures – as discussed
below, the same pattern is not present using CRA-SCL as the indicator of CRA, or when
examining Time 2 depression. For this reason, the three-way interaction with reactivity
was not examined further. There was not a significant three-way interaction between
cumulative stress, CRA, and age (p=.41).
For models using CRA-SCL, when each of the control variables except for SCLreactivity were added to the regression model, the two-way interaction between CRASCL and cumulative stress remained non-significant (all ps>.32). When SCL-reactivity
was added to the model, the two-way interaction between CRA-SCL and cumulative
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stress was significant (p=.03). This two-way interaction was qualified by a significant
three-way interaction between cumulative stress, CRA-SCL, and SCL-reactivity, β=.30,
t(125)=3.44, p=.001. Post-hoc examination of this interaction revealed that CRA-SCL
was not associated with lower levels of depression for highly stressed individuals at both
high and low levels of SCL-reactivity. Given the significant three way interaction with
CRA-SAD, cumulative stress, and reactivity mentioned above, this counterintuitive
finding might point to a very interesting phenomenon, the reliability of which should be
examined in future research. There were no significant three-way interactions between
CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, and age, sex, or trait reappraisal, respectively (all ps > .36).
Prospective effects of CRA. To investigate the prospective effects of CRA,
another set of multiple regressions was performed. Depressive symptoms at Time 2 were
entered as the dependent variable, and depressive symptoms at Time 1 were entered as a
main effect to the regression model. Additionally, cumulative stress at Time 1,
cumulative stress at Time 2, and CRA (both indices examined in separate regression
models) were all entered as main effects. Finally, the interaction between CRA and
cumulative stress at Time 2 was entered into the model. The results of these regressions
are shown in Appendix A, Table 6 and Table 7. For the model with CRA-SAD, there was
a significant main effect of Time 1 depressive symptoms, a significant main effect of
Time 2 cumulative stress, and a significant interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress
and CRA-SAD. To examine the interaction, the relationship was plotted using values ± 1
standard deviation on CRA-SAD and Time 2 cumulative stress, following the procedures
outlined by Aiken and West (1991). This interaction is shown in Appendix B, Figure 3.
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Simple slopes analyses revealed that the effect of Time 2 cumulative stress at low levels
of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than zero, β=.58, t(136)=7.86, p<.001. Likewise,
the effect of Time 2 cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SAD was also significantly
greater than zero, β=.37, t(136)=4.23, p<.001. Importantly, however, the effect of CRASAD at low levels of Time 2 cumulative stress was not significantly different from zero,
β=.04, t(136)=.58, p=.57, while the effect of CRA-SAD at high levels of Time 2
cumulative stress was significantly less than zero, β=-.17, t(136)= -2.33, p=.02. Thus, at
high levels of Time 2 stress, participants with higher levels of CRA-SAD had
significantly smaller increases in depressive symptoms from Time 1 to Time 2, relative to
those who were low in CRA-SAD.
For the model with CRA-SCL (shown in Appendix A, Table 7), there were
significant main effects of Time 1 depressive symptoms and Time 2 cumulative stress.
The main effect of Time 1 cumulative stress was marginally significant (p=.06). Neither
the main effect of CRA-SCL nor the interaction between CRA-SCL and Time 2
cumulative stress were significant.
Secondary analyses of prospective effects. To ensure that the significant
prospective interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress and CRA-SAD was not driven
by potential confounds, the model for CRA-SAD described above was re-run, this time
with sadness reactivity, trait reappraisal, age, and sex, added to the model, respectively.
When sadness reactivity, trait reappraisal, and age were each added to the
regression model, the prospective two-way interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress
and CRA-SAD remained significant (all ps <. 05). When sex was added to the model, the
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prospective interaction was marginally significant, β=-.09, t(129)= -1.71, p=.09. There
was no significant main effect of sex on Time 2 depressive symptoms, β=-.06, t(129)= 1.17, p=.24, and no significant three-way interaction between Time 2 cumulative stress,
CRA-SAD, and sex, β=.15, t(129)=0.94, p=.35. Therefore, the effect of sex on the
prospective findings was not examined further.
Question Two: Do the Protective Effects of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability Differ
Depending on How Controllable the Context is?
To answer Question Two, a series of multiple regressions was conducted to
examine the cross-sectional effects of cumulative stress, CRA, and stressor controllability
on depression. Depressive symptoms at Time 1 were entered as the dependent variable.
CRA, Time 1 cumulative stress, and Time 1 stressor controllability were each entered as
main effects, along with all possible two-way and three-way interactions. Two models
were run to examine the effects of CRA-SAD and CRA-SCL separately. The results of
these regressions are shown in Appendix A, Table 8 and Table 9.
Cross-sectional analysis using CRA-SAD. For the model with CRA-SAD
(Appendix A, Table 8), there was a significant main effect of cumulative stress, a
significant main effect of CRA-SAD, and a significant two-way interaction between
CRA-SAD and stressor controllability. There was also a significant three-way interaction
between cumulative stress, CRA-SAD, and stressor controllability. To examine the threeway interaction, the relationship was plotted using values ± 1 standard deviation on each
of the independent variables, following the procedures outlined by Aiken and West
(1991). This interaction is shown in Appendix B, Figure 4.
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In the context of more uncontrollable stress (Figure 4, Panel A), simple slopes
analyses revealed that the effect of cumulative stress at low levels of CRA-SAD was
significantly greater than zero, β=1.14, t(153)=5.66, p<.001. Likewise, the effect of
cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than zero, β=.38,
t(153)=2.62, p=.01. Importantly, however, the effect of CRA-SAD at low levels of
cumulative stress was not significantly different from zero, β=-.04, t(153)=-.32, p=.75,
while the effect of CRA-SAD at high levels of cumulative stress was significantly less
than zero, β=-.80, t(153)= -3.63, p<.001. Thus, in the context of relatively uncontrollable
stress, the pattern that has been reported in previous research (Troy et al., 2010) was
replicated; those who were highly stressed and high in CRA-SAD were significantly less
depressed than those who were highly stressed and low in CRA-SAD.
In the context of more controllable stress, however, a different pattern was
observed (Appendix B, Figure 4, Panel B). The effect of cumulative stress at low levels
of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than zero, β=.39, t(153)=3.35, p=.001. Likewise,
the effect of cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SAD was significantly greater than
zero, β=.83, t(153)=6.01, p<.001. Importantly, however, the effect of CRA-SAD at low
levels of cumulative stress was not significantly different from zero, β=-.10, t(153)=-.93,
p=.35, while the effect of CRA-SAD at high levels of cumulative stress was significantly
greater than zero, β=.33, t(153)=2.61, p=.01. Thus, compared to uncontrollable contexts,
the relationship between CRA-SAD and depressive symptoms at high levels of stress is
reversed in the context of controllable stress. Specifically, at high levels of stress, those
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who are high in CRA-SAD are significantly more depressed than those who are highly
stressed and low in CRA-SAD.
Cross-sectional analysis using CRA-SCL. For the model with CRA-SCL
(Appendix A, Table 9), there was a significant main effect of cumulative stress. In
addition, there was a significant three-way interaction between cumulative stress, CRASCL, and stressor controllability. This interaction is depicted in Appendix B, Figure 5
using values ± 1 SD from the mean on each of the independent variables.
In the context of more uncontrollable stress (Figure 5, Panel A), simple slopes
analyses revealed that the effect of cumulative stress at low levels of CRA-SCL was
significantly greater than zero, β=.99, t(131)=5.70, p<.001. Likewise, the effect of
cumulative stress at high levels of CRA-SCL was also significantly greater than zero,
β=.62, t(131)=3.97, p<.001. The effect of CRA-SCL at low levels of cumulative stress
was not significantly different from zero, β=-.08, t(131)=.70, p=.49. At high levels of
cumulative stress, the effect of CRA-SCL was negative, indicating that those who were
higher in CRA-SCL had lower levels of depression compared to those with lower CRASCL, however, this difference was not statistically significant, β=-.30, t(131)= -1.45,
p=.15. Thus, in the context of uncontrollable stress, the pattern observed using CRA-SCL
is similar to the pattern observed using CRA-SAD. Specifically, when moving from low
to high stress, the increase in depressive symptoms is smaller for those who are higher in
CRA-SCL, relative to those who are lower in CRA-SCL.
Compared to uncontrollable stress, in the context of more controllable stress, a
different relationship was observed (Appendix B, Figure 5, Panel B). The effect of
50

cumulative stress at low levels of CRA-SCL was not significantly greater than zero,
β=.20, t(131)=1.07, p=.29. However, the effect of cumulative stress at high levels of
CRA-SCL was significantly greater than zero, β=.80, t(131)=5.09, p<.001. In addition,
the effect of CRA-SCL at low levels of cumulative stress was not significantly different
from zero, β=-.15, t(131)=-.88, p=.38, while the effect of CRA-SCL at high levels of
cumulative stress was significantly greater than zero, β=.46, t(131)=2.61, p=.01. Thus, in
uncontrollable contexts, the relationship between CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, and
depressive symptoms is very similar to the relationship observed using CRA-SAD.
Specifically, when moving from low to high stress, individuals who are low in CRA-SCL
did not exhibit significant increases in depressive symptoms. Additionally, at high levels
of stress, those who are low in CRA-SCL were significantly less depressed than those
who were high in CRA-SCL.
Secondary analyses of cross-sectional effects. To ensure that the significant
three way interactions described above were not driven by potential confounds, a new
series of regression models was examined, which control for the effects of reactivity, trait
reappraisal use, sex, and age. For models using CRA-SAD, when each of these control
variables was entered into the regression model, the three-way interaction between CRASAD, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability remained significant (all ps < .01). In
addition, there were no significant 4-way interactions between CRA-SAD, cumulative
stress, stressor controllability, and each of the control variables, respectively (all ps>.24,
except for the 4-way interaction with sex, p=.09).
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For regression models using CRA-SCL, when each of the control variables were
added to the model, the three way interaction between CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, and
stressor controllability remained significant (all ps<.03). There were no significant 4-way
interactions between CRA-SCL, cumulative stress, stressor controllability, and any of the
control variables (all ps>.38, except for the 4-way interaction with age, p=.06).
Longitudinal prospective effects of CRA across contexts. To investigate
whether the relationship between CRA, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability
(described above) prospectively predicts changes in depression, another set of multiple
regressions were performed. This time, Time 2 depressive symptoms were entered as the
dependent variable. Time 1 depressive symptoms, Time 1 cumulative stress, and Time 1
stressor controllability were each entered as independent variables. In addition Time 2
cumulative stress, Time 2 stressor controllability, and CRA were entered as independent
variables. This allowed me to assess change in depressive symptoms, change in
cumulative stress, and change in stressor controllability over time. I additionally added all
possible two-way interactions between Time 2 cumulative stress, Time 2 stressor
controllability, and CRA to the model, in addition to the three-way interaction between
these variables. As above, separate regressions were conducted for CRA-SAD and CRASCL, respectively. The results of these regressions are shown in Appendix A, Table 10
and Table 11.
For the model with CRA-SAD (Table 10), there were significant main effects of
Time 1 depressive symptoms, Time 1 stressor controllability, and Time 2 cumulative
stress. None of the other main effects or interactions in this model were significant.
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For the model with CRA-SCL (Table 11), there were significant main effects of
Time 1 depressive symptoms and Time 2 cumulative stress. None of the other main
effects or interactions in the model were significant.
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Chapter Four: Discussion
Previous research has consistently shown that the trait use of cognitive reappraisal
allows people to effectively regulate their emotions, and is associated with positive
psychological health outcomes (Garnefski et al., 2003; Gross & John, 2003). More recent
research has focused on cognitive reappraisal ability, or the degree to which individuals
can change their emotions when using reappraisal (McRae et al., 2012b, Shiota &
Levenson, 2009; Troy et al., 2010). CRA has been shown to be empirically distinct from
trait reappraisal use (McRae et al., 2012b), and to predict psychological health over and
above the effects of trait reappraisal use (Troy et al., 2010). Specifically, CRA appears to
be an important protective factor against depression in the immediate aftermath of stress
(Troy et al., 2010).
To date, however, the effects of CRA on psychological health have only been
examined cross-sectionally. Understanding the long-term relationship between CRA and
psychological health is an important next step in building a causal model of CRA and
long-term adjustment to stress. In addition, although most previous research on emotion
regulation has focused on intraindividual processes, many theoretical accounts suggest
that no psychological process is inherently adaptive in all contexts (Folkman &
Moskowitz, 2000b; Mischel, 1968). This theoretical perspective suggests that CRA may
not act as a protective factor in all contexts, and may even be associated with negative
outcomes in some situations. Although previous research on CRA has not examined
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whether the observed protective effects are context specific, theoretical considerations
suggest that one aspect of stressful situations may be especially important: stressor
controllability. Specifically, CRA may be a particularly adaptive process in
uncontrollable situations: if very little can be done to change the situation itself, it may be
better to change one’s emotions instead. In more controllable situations, however, where
direct action can and should be taken, CRA may be less adaptive. Thus, the present
research extends upon previous research on CRA by examining two open questions: 1)
Does CRA have long-term, prospective effects on psychological health? and 2) Do the
protective effects of CRA differ depending on how controllable the context is?
The Prospective Effects of CRA
Previous research has found that CRA interacts with life stress to predict
depression, such that those who are highly stressed and high in CRA are significantly less
depressed than those who are highly stressed and low in CRA (Troy et al., 2010).
Because these findings are cross-sectional, however, it remains unclear whether CRA is
implicated in long-term adjustment to stress, and whether or not CRA plays a causal role
in psychological health. That is, it may be that the effects of CRA on psychological
health are short-lived, and therefore, not important for long-term outcomes. In addition, it
is possible that the previously reported relationship between CRA and depression is
driven by third variable confounds, or the directionality of the relationship between CRA
and depression is reversed.
Therefore, in the first part of the present study, I examined the prospective effects
of CRA on depressive symptoms. As hypothesized, CRA-SAD (the ability to down55

regulate feelings of sadness) interacted with changes in stress over six months to predict
changes in depressive symptoms over six months. Specifically, individuals with large
increases in stress and high CRA-SAD reported significantly smaller increases in
depressive symptoms over a six month time period, relative to individuals with large
increases in stress and low CRA-SAD. Thus, CRA appears to be an important protective
factor against increases in depression for individuals who are highly stressed.
Theoretical implications. The observed prospective findings lend support to a
theoretical model in which cognitive reappraisal ability is critically implicated in longterm adjustment to stress. These findings advance our understanding of how emotion
regulation ability contributes to long-term risk and resilience in highly stressed
populations. In line with previous research (Troy et al., 2010), CRA interacted with stress
to predict depression, which supports the hypothesis that CRA is particularly important
for psychological health amongst highly stressed individuals, perhaps because these
individuals have elevated levels of negative emotions that need to be regulated.
The fact that individual differences in CRA-SAD preceded the observed changes
in stress and depressive symptoms strengthens the argument that CRA causally
contributes to psychological health in highly stressful contexts. That is, the prospective
design used in this study allows us to rule out the alternative explanations that CRA may
simply be a side effect of someone’s current life stress, or an indicator of current
depression. In addition, given that this relationship held when controlling for potential
key confounds, it is unlikely that the present findings were simply driven by a third
variable such as trait reappraisal use, sadness reactivity, age, or sex. However, while the
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present study is an important step in the direction of a causal model of CRA, it does not
allow for causal conclusions because it did not experimentally manipulate CRA.
In addition, these results enhance our understanding of what constitutes
“successful” cognitive reappraisal. The present results support the hypothesis that, in
addition to simply using an adaptive strategy like cognitive reappraisal, it is also critically
important to be able to use this strategy to change one’s emotional states. Importantly, in
line with previous research (Troy et al., 2010), the laboratory measure of CRA was
unrelated to trait reappraisal use. In addition, the prospective findings remained
significant when controlling for trait reappraisal, supporting the hypothesis that CRA
predicts variance in psychological health over and above the effects of trait reappraisal
use. These results are consistent with the idea that the frequency of reappraisal use is
distinct from the ability to use reappraisal, and that these two constructs predict
psychological health and adjustment to stress differently. It is also important to note that
the laboratory measure of CRA was unrelated to several potential confounds, including
cumulative stress, stressor controllability, age, education, self-efficacy, and verbal
intelligence.
Notably, CRA-SAD was positively related to self-reported reappraisal ability,
suggesting that this laboratory challenge measure is valid. The fact that CRA-SAD and
CRA-SCL did not always predict depression in the same way and, (as shown in
Appendix A, Table 3) did not always correlate with other measures in the same way
suggests that these two indices of CRA may be capturing separable constructs, rather than
two measures of the same thing. It will be important for future research to further
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examine the regulation of feelings versus the regulation of arousal in order to better
understand how these potentially independent abilities may differentially relate to
psychological health.
Clinical implications. These findings also have several important clinical
implications. First, these findings support a model of depression in which deficits in the
ability to effectively regulate negative emotions play a key role in the development and
maintenance of depression in highly stressed populations. In this way, these findings may
help to elucidate the etiology of depression and other forms of psychopathology. Second,
these results have the potential to inform clinical interventions for depression. Notably,
many existing forms of treatment, especially cognitive therapies, already include large
components that focus on identifying overly negative appraisals and replacing them with
more realistic or positive reinterpretations (Campbell-Sils & Barlow, 2007). This
practice clearly overlaps with the definition of cognitive reappraisal. In light of the
current findings, it may be that cognitive therapies that strengthen individuals’ ability to
use reappraisal will lead to positive clinical outcomes. In particular, interventions that
target negative appraisals may be particularly beneficial for highly stressed individuals,
as well as other populations at risk for depression. Importantly, laboratory paradigms like
the one used in the present study could potentially be used to identify people who are low
in CRA, and thus, may be at particular risk for developing depression in the face of high
stress. In this way, at risk individuals could potentially be identified and targeted for
intervention before psychopathology has developed.
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Discussion of null effects. It is important to note that the prospective effects that
were observed for CRA-SAD (based on changes in self-reported sadness) were not
present when using the second index of CRA, CRA-SCL (changes in skin conductance
level). It is always difficult to determine why null results are obtained. For instance, if the
effect sizes are smaller when using CRA-SCL as the index of CRA, the null results may
have simply been due to a lack of power. Indeed, when examining the significant three
way interactions between cumulative stress, CRA, and stressor controllability (reported in
Appendix A, Tables 8 and 9), the effect size associated with the three-way interaction
using CRA-SAD (change in r²=.04, p=.001) was stronger than the effect size for the
three-way interaction using CRA-SCL (change in r²=.02, p=.02). Thus, even though both
interactions were statistically significant, the effect size for the interaction with CRASAD was twice as strong as the interaction with CRA-SCL.
Additionally, it may be that the ability to change one’s subjective experience of
sadness is more important for psychological health than one’s ability to change
physiological arousal. That is, in the long-term, individuals who are only able to change
their level of physiological arousal, but who are not able to feel subjectively “better” after
reappraisal may not be protected against increased depression. It will be important for
future research to better determine whether the present null results are simply due to a
lack of power, or if physiological indicators of CRA are simply not associated with longterm psychological health.
In addition, the present study did not replicate the previously reported crosssectional interaction between CRA and cumulative stress in predicting depressive
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symptoms (Troy et al., 2010). As mentioned above, it is always difficult to interpret null
effects, and there may be several reasons for this failure to replicate. First, the present
study recruited individuals who had experienced a stressful life event in the past 8 weeks,
while the previously reported study recruited individuals who had experienced a stressful
life event in the past 12 weeks. Therefore, the time period between Time 1 and Time 2
captured in the present study (between 8 weeks and 6 months after the stressor) partially
overlaps with the time period captured at Time 1 in the previous study (12 weeks after the
stressor). Given that reappraisal is thought to be an adaptive strategy because it allows
individuals to engage with negative events, and to find positive meaning in these events,
it may be that it takes time after exposure to a stressor for the relationship between CRA
and depression to emerge. If this is the case, the present sample may not have been far
enough removed from the initial stress exposure to experience the benefits of CRA.
Future research could examine this hypothesis by examining several windows of time
since exposure to stress to better determine when the relationship between CRA and
depression emerges. If the hypothesis is true, the significant interaction between CRA
and stress in predicting depression would not be present until 12 weeks or more have
elapsed since stress exposure.
Another potential explanation for the lack of cross-sectional effects observed in
the present study may be the levels of cumulative stress observed at Time 1. Although the
mean levels of cumulative stress observed in the present study (M=15.9, SD=10.9) are
comparable to those observed in the previous study (M=15.9, SD=11.5; Troy et al.,
2010), the observed range of scores was narrower in the present study (Range: 1-46)
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relative to the previous study (Range: 2-60). Thus, the present sample included fewer
people with very high levels of cumulative stress. Given that predicted differences in
depression due to CRA were hypothesized (and previously reported) to be at high levels
of stress, this restriction of range may have been responsible for the null cross-sectional
results.
It should be noted, however, that the prospective relationship was significant in
the current study, even though Time 2 stress levels were not as high as Time 1 stress
levels (Time 2 cumulative stress M=9.8, SD=9.3, Range: 0-40). It may be that the
relationship between CRA and depression in the immediate aftermath of stress exposure
is particularly driven by individuals with very high levels of stress (and presumably the
highest levels of negative emotions), while the long-term relationship between CRA and
depression may hold for a wider range of stress levels, as people have more time to use
reappraisal to make meaning of the stressors they have encountered. Future studies could
test this hypothesis by recruiting participants with a wider range of stress levels, a wider
range of time since stress exposure, and more than two data collection points.
The Protective Effects of CRA in Controllable Versus Uncontrollable Contexts
Although previous research (and the prospective results reported above) suggest
that CRA is an adaptive process that protects against negative psychological health
outcomes, theoretical models across the social sciences have emphasized that few, if any,
psychological processes are adaptive in all contexts (Endler & Magnusson, 1976;
Folkman & Moskowitz, 2000b). This raises the important question of whether there may
be contexts in which CRA is maladaptive. I hypothesized that CRA is maladaptive (i.e.,
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associated with increased depression) in controllable stressful contexts, where the most
adaptive coping strategy likely involves taking direct action to decrease the impact of the
stressor. In uncontrollable stressful situations, however, where more active coping is
likely not possible, CRA should be an adaptive process because it allows individuals to
manage the one thing they do have control over: their emotions.
In the second part of the present research, I found support for the hypothesis that
the protective effects of CRA would be present in uncontrollable stressful contexts and
absent in controllable stressful contexts. Specifically, in the context of relatively
uncontrollable stress, CRA interacted with stress to predict depression, such that those
who were highly stressed and high in CRA were significantly less depressed than those
who were highly stressed and low in CRA. That is, for uncontrollable stress, the
protective effects of CRA that have been reported in past research (Troy et al., 2010)
were present. In the context of relatively controllable stress, however, this same pattern
of results was not present. Instead, CRA interacted with stress to predict depressive
symptoms such that those who were highly stressed and high in CRA were significantly
more depressed than those who were highly stressed and low in CRA. Thus, the
protective effects of CRA in the context of controllable stress were reversed, such that
high CRA was associated with worse psychological health.
These results support a novel theoretical model in which the protective effects of
CRA depend upon the context. In uncontrollable stressful contexts, in which an
individual is unlikely to be able to diminish the negative effects of a stressor by taking
direct action, CRA may be a particularly adaptive process because it allows the individual
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to manage his or her negative emotions and help come to terms with the reality of the
negative situation. In situations in which nothing else can be done, effective emotion
regulation should be a particularly adaptive way to arm oneself against negative
psychological health outcomes.
In controllable contexts, however, where it is possible for the individual to use
more direct forms of coping such as active problem solving, CRA may be a maladaptive
process. From a functionalist perspective, negative emotions can be adaptive, because
they allow us to respond appropriately to the environment. For example, feelings of
anxiety may motivate us to work harder if we are worried about an important deadline at
work. In the context of controllable stress, the presence of negative emotions may be
particularly adaptive because they motivate individuals to take direct action to cope with
the stressor at hand. Importantly, however, individuals who successfully down-regulate
their negative emotions in controllable contexts may not be motivated to take direct
action, because they are no longer experiencing high levels of negative emotions. That is,
effective emotion regulation may lead to negative outcomes in the context of controllable
stress because it leads to lower levels of active coping. The present study does not allow
for the examination of active coping. Therefore, future research should examine the
hypothesis that high CRA may lead to lower levels of active coping in controllable
stressful contexts.
Theoretical implications. The present study is one of the first to suggest that
CRA may be maladaptive in certain contexts. Given that the relationship between
emotion regulation ability and psychological health appears to be context dependent,
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these results have very important implications for what “adaptive” emotion regulation is.
That is, rather than simply considering which emotion regulation strategy is being used,
and how effectively an individual can use a particular strategy, we also need to consider
the context in which the strategy is being used. In this way, as others have suggested, the
most adaptive emotion regulation may involve the flexible deployment of lots of different
strategies, depending upon the context an individual finds him or herself in (Kashdan &
Rottenberg, 2010). On a general level, these results suggest that it is important to
consider the fit between persons (in terms of their ability to use different emotion
regulation strategies, and the frequency with which they use these strategies) and
situations (in terms of which strategies are generally adaptive in the specific context that
the individual is in).
In the future, it will be important to continue testing this general theoretical model
by examining other types of situational factors that may moderate the protective effects
of CRA. Specifically, other factors related to the nature of stressful life events such as
stressor predictability, normativeness, and acuteness may all also serve as important
moderators. For example, it may be that CRA is more adaptive in the context of
predictable (i.e., stressors that individuals know will happen ahead of time, for instance,
retirement) stressors because individuals have lots of time to use reappraisal to come to
terms with the reality of the event before it has even happened, which may enhance the
protective effects of CRA. Relatedly, CRA may be maladaptive in the context of very
acute (i.e., very short-lasting) stressors because there may not be an adequate amount of
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time for the protective effects of CRA to emerge before the negative effects of the
stressor have diminished simply as a function of time.
Although it is likely that numerous contextual factors serve as moderators of the
effects of CRA, theoretical considerations suggest that the controllability of a stressful
situation is a key moderator of these effects. That is, uncontrollable stressful situations
appear to be particularly well-suited for CRA – when you cannot do anything to change
the stressor itself, it is adaptive to be able to change your negative emotions. More
controllable stressful situations appear to be more poorly suited for CRA, when direct
action and problem solving would be more appropriate forms of coping.
It bears noting that the two broad forms of coping that have been discussed in the
present study, emotion focused coping and problem focused coping, are by no means
mutually exclusive. Indeed, Folkman and Lazarus (1980) have found that most people
report using a combination of both types of coping when experiencing stress. Therefore,
the results of the present study do not imply that an individual should never use
reappraisal in a situation that is controllable. Rather, it appears important to consider the
degree to which reappraisal is being used, relative to other active forms of coping. Future
studies that examine both emotion focused coping and active coping are needed to better
understand how these two forms of coping could be combined in potentially adaptive
ways.
Future research should also examine other emotion regulation strategies to
examine whether the context specificity observed in the present study would extend to
strategies besides reappraisal. For instance, although suppression has been consistently
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linked with negative psychological health outcomes (Ehring et al., 2008; Gross & John,
2003), there may be some situations in which the use of suppression is actually adaptive.
For example, expressive suppression may be adaptive (or at least, less maladaptive) in the
context of controllable stress, where not showing how one is feeling may better allow an
individual to engage in more active coping processes (relative to a strategy like
reappraisal, which may hinder active coping). On a more general level, it may be that
emotion regulation strategies that target emotion experience are less adaptive in
controllable circumstances, while strategies that target emotion expression are less
adaptive in uncontrollable circumstances.
It is important to note that the vast majority of research on cognitive reappraisal to
date has found a positive relationship between the use of this strategy and psychological
health outcomes (cf. Garenefski et al., 2001; Gross & John, 2003; Kraaij et al., 2002).
The present study is one of the first to suggest that reappraisal may lead to worse
psychological health outcomes in certain contexts. This apparent contradiction is likely
due to a number of factors. First, most research has not examined reappraisal in different
contexts. The fact that many studies have found significant main effects of reappraisal on
psychological health while collapsing across contexts, however, suggests that CRA is an
adaptive process in many different situations. Second, most research has not examined
reappraisal specifically in the context of high stress. Given that the context specific
effects of CRA in the present study were only observed among highly stressed
individuals, it may be that the context specific effects of CRA are not present in less
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stressful situations. Future research can further test this hypothesis by examining other
types of stressful contexts and a wide range of stress levels.
Clinical implications. While many existing clinical interventions may
specifically target and strengthen CRA (Campbell-Sils & Barlow, 2007), these results
suggest that individuals should be taught that reappraisal should be used in context
appropriate ways, rather than simply using it in any emotional situation that an individual
encounters. Specifically, clinicians could include psycho-educational components in their
interventions that help clients understand when reappraisal would be a helpful strategy to
use (i.e., uncontrollable situations), and when it wouldn’t be helpful (i.e., controllable
situations). In addition, it may be useful to help clients identify alternate emotion
regulation strategies besides reappraisal that could be used in controllable contexts, such
as distraction, problem-solving, or situation selection. The current study did not examine
other regulatory abilities – future research should measure the ability to use other
strategies like distraction, suppression, and acceptance to try to identify specific
strategy/context combinations that appear to be adaptive.
Discussion of null effects. It bears noting that my hypotheses for Question 2 were
only supported cross-sectionally. When examining the three-way interaction between
CRA, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability prospectively, the results were not
significant for either index of CRA. As with other null results in this study, this may have
been due to a lack of power -- the regression models used to test these hypotheses
required the presence of a large number of variables in the models, which may have
resulted in these complex models being underpowered. Indeed, a post-hoc power
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analysis, based on the size of the longitudinal regression models and the current sample
size, estimates the minimum detectable β to be 0.3 assuming that power was 80% (Lenth,
2006-9). Given that the significant three-way interactions between CRA (both indices),
stressor controllability, and cumulative stress at Time 1 both had βs less than 0.3, it
seems likely that the Time 2 regression models in question were indeed underpowered.
In addition, because the present study design was not experimental, it is possible
that there could have been an unmeasured third variable that accounted for the observed
cross-sectional effects. This possibility seems unlikely, given that the results remained
significant when controlling for key confounds such as reactivity, trait reappraisal, sex,
and age. In addition, the observed discriminant validity of the CRA measures (see
Appendix A, Table 2) and the measure of stressor controllability (see Appendix A, Table
3) was quite high.. In the future, however, it will be important to conduct high-powered
longitudinal and experimental studies in order to test the claim that the observed
relationship between CRA, cumulative stress, and stressor controllability predicts longterm changes in psychological health.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current study had several important methodological strengths that allowed me
to build upon previous research. First, I tested my hypotheses using a large community
sample of both men and women who represented a wide range of ages, ethnicities, and
socioeconomic backgrounds. Thus, the results of the present study are highly
generalizeable. Second, I used a multi-method laboratory challenge measure of CRA,
rather than self-reported ability. Thus, my estimates of CRA are unlikely to be
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contaminated by retrospective biases, self-presentational biases, or a lack of insight into
one’s regulatory ability. Third, in addition to cross-sectional methods, I employed a
longitudinal design, which allowed me to assess change in cumulative stress, stressor
controllability, and depressive symptoms over time. This prospective design allowed me
to better rule out third variable confounds and to make advances toward a causal model
of CRA. Fourth, rather than using a self-report measure of stressor controllability, which
may be confounded with an individual’s current levels of life stress, depression, or
coping ability, I recruited a separate sample of coders who provided more objective
ratings of stressor controllability. There are four important limitations to the current
study, however, that warrant further research.
First, the present study only examined individuals’ ability to use reappraisal,
which is just one of many different strategies that individuals can use to regulate their
emotions. Indeed, the relationship between other types of regulatory abilities and
psychological health has not been heavily studied, and remains poorly understood. In
light of the finding that CRA is not adaptive in all contexts, it will be important for future
research to examine individual differences in the ability to use other strategies such as
suppression, acceptance, distraction, and situation selection in order to better understand
how these abilities predict psychological health, and in which contexts these abilities may
be adaptive.
Similarly, I only measured individuals’ ability to use one very specific type of
cognitive reappraisal: positive reappraisal. Recent research has shown that there are many
different sub-types of reappraisal, including reappraisals related to self-distancing,
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challenging reality, or agency (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012; Ochsner et al., 2004)).
It may be that individuals have different abilities to use different sub-types of reappraisal,
and that different types of reappraisal predict psychological health and adjustment to
stress in different ways. It will be important for future research to examine these
important hypotheses. With particular regard to intervention and prevention programs, it
may be helpful to know if an individual is low in the ability to use one type of reappraisal
but high in the ability to use other types of reappraisal. In this way, unique strengths and
weaknesses could be identified and targeted for improvement. It will also be important
for future research to examine the context specific effects of other sub-types of
reappraisal. For instance, reappraisals targeting an individual’s agency may be
particularly adaptive in controllable contexts.
Second, the present study only examined depression as the psychological health
outcome of interest. This is because depression is one of the most common and one of the
most debilitating outcomes associated with exposure to stressful life events (Greenberg et
al., 2003). From a theoretical standpoint, I would predict that CRA is broadly implicated
in psychological health, which would include other negative outcomes like anxiety
symptoms and PTSD symptoms, as well as positive outcomes like psychological wellbeing and satisfaction with life. The present study, however, did not allow me to examine
these other outcomes. In addition, the present sample was not a clinical sample but a
community sample of highly stressed individuals who were at risk for increased
depression. It remains unknown, therefore, whether the present results would extend to
clinical populations that have been diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder. From a
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theoretical perspective, it seems likely that CRA is an important contributor to
psychological health in both clinical and non-clinical populations. However, future
studies are needed to formally test this hypothesis.
Third, I assume that CRA is a fairly stable ability that individuals possess, similar
to intelligence, and is thus relatively unaffected by stress, depression, or socioeconomic
conditions. The fact that neither index of CRA was significantly correlated with Time 1
cumulative stress, Time 1 depressive symptoms, stressor controllability, years of
education, or verbal intelligence lends partial support to this hypothesis. However, the
present study design did not allow me to assess test-retest reliability of the CRA measure.
Therefore, it remains unknown whether an individual’s performance on the CRA task is
relatively stable over time.
Fourth, future research should continue to examine the validity of the CRA task.
Although we avoid many important confounds that may be inherent in self-reported
CRA, it is difficult to know if everyone in our sample was truly using reappraisal during
the task, and thus, whether or not the CRA scores are truly tapping reappraisal ability and
not another construct. The fact that CRA was not related to constructs like current
depressive symptoms, cumulative stress, stressor controllability, age, or verbal
intelligence, and that it was related to self-reported reappraisal ability certainly lends
support to the hypothesis that we are measuring CRA with this task. It is still possible,
however, that some participants did not understand the instructions, or used a different
strategy during the task. This possibility was minimized by encouraging participants to
ask questions if they did not understand the instructions, and the participants’ responses
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to the manipulation check questions indicated that they tried very hard to use reappraisal
when instructed. However, future research can further explore this question by collecting
more detailed data from the participants after the task to gain a better understanding of
what participants are truly doing when they are instructed to reappraise. The fact that we
still found significant results without being able to examine or remove individuals who
were not following the instructions suggests that the present results may have been even
stronger if we had been able to identify such individuals.
Concluding Comment
In sum, the results of the present study show that the ability to use cognitive
reappraisal ability (CRA) serves as an important protective factor against long-term
increases in depression. Specifically, CRA interacted with changes in life stress to predict
changes in depressive symptoms, such that those individuals with large increases in stress
and high levels of CRA reported significantly smaller increases in depressive symptoms
over a six-month period, relative to individuals with large increases in stress and low
levels of CRA. These results support the hypothesis that CRA is a critical contributor to
psychological health in highly stressful contexts. However, part two of the present study
highlighted the idea that the type of stress that individuals encounter matters. Results
indicated that the protective effects of CRA are present in the context of uncontrollable
stress, but the protective effects of CRA were reversed in the context of controllable
stress. That is, in controllable stressful contexts, CRA was associated with increased
depressive symptoms. Importantly, this is one of the first studies to show that cognitive
reappraisal can be maladaptive in some contexts, which suggests that the protective
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effects of specific emotion regulation strategies are context dependent. These results have
important implications for understanding how emotion regulation ability contributes to
risk and resilience in the face of stress, for clinical interventions and prevention
programs, and for understanding what constitutes adaptive emotion regulation across
contexts.
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Appendix A
Table 1
Participant Characteristics for Original Sample and Matched Coders
Variable

Original Sample

Matched Coders

Statistic

p

(n=164)

(n=22)

Mean age (SD)

40.4 (11.5)

38.3 (10.8)

t(184)=0.79

.43

Sex (% female)

50.6

45.5

χ²(1)=0.21

.65

χ²(4)=1.80

.77

Race (%)
White

85.3

81.8

American
Indian/Alaskan
Native

1.2

0

Asian

1.2

4.5

Black

5.5

4.5

Multiple Races

6.7

9.1

Mean education
(SD; 1-7; <7th
grade-graduate
training)

5.6 (1.0)

5.5 (1.0)

t(184)=0.38

.71

Income (1-8;
5.0 (2.1)
<10,000->100,000)

4.2 (1.8)

t(166)=1.56

.12

Mean depressive
symptoms (SD; 060)

8.6b (7.0)

t(184)=2.06

.05

12.1a (9.9)

Note. Means with differing subscripts within rows are significantly different at the p<.05
level. Specific ns for each comparison may slightly differ due to different numbers of
missing values across variables.
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Table 2.
Correlations of Key Measures with Both Indices of Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA)
CRA-SADa

CRA-SCLb

Time One Depressive Symptoms

-.14†

.09

Time One Cumulative Stress

-.12

-.03

Time One Stressor Controllability

.01

-.06

Time Two Depressive Symptoms

-.22

Time Two Cumulative Stress

-.20* c

.15 d

.14

-.11

Years of Education

-.09

-.04

Family Income

.26*

.01

Age

-.05

-.08

Trait Reappraisal Use

-.01

-.09

Self-Reported Reappraisal Ability

.18*

-.13

.12

-.11

Social Desirability

.22*

-.03

Neuroticism

-.09

.15

Extraversion

.14†

-.14

Sadness Reactivity

.20*

.01

SCL Reactivity

.10

e

.36

-.01

-.02

Variables in the regression model

Time Two Stressor Controllability

*c

.18† d

Demographics

Emotion Regulation and Personality Variables

Self-Efficacy

Emotional Reactivity

Verbal Intelligence

86

*f

a

n = 164, except for Time 2 Variables and SCL Reactivity. bn = 127, except for Time Two
variables and SCL Reactivity. cn = 136. dn = 107. en = 125. fn = 118. Specific ns for each cell

differ due to different numbers of missing values across variables.
† p < .10, * p < .05
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Table 3.
Correlations of Key Measures with Time 1 and Time 2 Stressor Controllability
T1 Controllabilitya

T2 Controllabilityb

Time One Depressive Symptoms

.08

-.06

Time One Cumulative Stress

.21*

.03

Time Two Depressive Symptoms

.03

c

-.07

Time Two Cumulative Stress

.15†

Variables in the regression model

CRA-SAD (changes in sadness)

c

.01

CRA-SCL (changes in skin
conductance level)

-.06

-.04
.14

d

-.11

f

Demographics
Years of Education

-.07

.04

Family Income

-.13

.01

Age

-.11

-.08

Trait Reappraisal Use

-.04

.08

Self-Reported Reappraisal Ability

-.05

-.03

Self-Efficacy

-.08

.08

Social Desirability

-.07

.07

Neuroticism

.10

-.03

Extraversion

-.06

.24*

Sadness Reactivity

-.05

.03

SCL Reactivity

.11e

-.03f

Verbal Intelligence

-.04

-.04

Emotion Regulation and Personality
Variables

Emotional Reactivity

88

a

n = 161, except for Time 2 Variables, CRA-SCL, and SCL reactivity. bn = 117, except for CRASCL and SCL reactivity. cn = 134. dn = 126. en = 123. fn = 93. Specific ns for each cell differ

due to different numbers of missing values across variables.
† p < .10, * p < .05
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Table 4
Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SAD:
Changes in Sadness) and Cumulative Stress.
B

t

p

Cumulative stress

.61

9.72

.001

Cognitive reappraisal

-.07

-1.09

.28

.05

0.87

.39

ability (CRA-SAD)
Cumulative stress x
CRA-SAD
Note. R2 for the model = .39. B = Betas (standardized), n = 164
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Table 5
Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SCL:
Changes in Skin Conductance Level) and Cumulative Stress.
B

t

p

Cumulative stress

.62

9.34

.001

Cognitive reappraisal

.10

1.44

.15

.01

0.20

.85

ability (CRA-SCL)
Cumulative stress x
CRA-SAD
Note. R2 for the model = .41. B = Betas (standardized), n = 141
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Table 6
Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1
Cumulative Stress, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, and Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRASAD: Changes in Sadness).
B

T

p

Time 1 Depressive symptoms

.53

8.57

.001

Time 1 Cumulative stress

-.07

-1.05

.30

Time 2 Cumulative stress

.48

7.68

.001

Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-

-.06

-1.18

.24

-.10

-2.01

.05

SAD)
Time 2 Cumulative stress x CRA-SAD

Note. R2 for the model = .68. B = Betas (standardized), n = 136
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Table 7
Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1
Cumulative Stress, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, and Cognitive Reappraisal Ability (CRASCL: Changes in Skin Conductance Level).
B

T

p

Time 1 Depressive symptoms

.59

8.78

.001

Time 1 Cumulative stress

-.14

-1.89

.06

Time 2 Cumulative stress

.49

7.29

.001

Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-

.03

0.51

.62

.02

0.33

.74

SCL)
Time 2 Cumulative stress x CRA-SCL

Note. R2 for the model = .70. B = Betas (standardized), n = 119
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Table 8
Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cumulative Stress, Cognitive Reappraisal
Ability (CRA-SAD; changes in sadness), and Stressor Controllability
B

T

p

Cumulative stress (Stress)

.69

10.55

.001

Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-

-.15

-2.34

.02

Stressor controllability (Control)

-.05

-0.66

.51

Stress x CRA-SAD

-.09

-1.21

.23

Stress x Control

-.07

-0.85

.40

CRA-SAD x Control

.26

3.33

.001

Stress x CRA-SAD x Control

.29

3.47

.001

SAD)

Note. R2 for the model = .45. B = Betas (standardized), n = 161
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Table 9
Current Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Cumulative Stress, Cognitive Reappraisal
Ability (CRA-SCL; changes in skin conductance level), and Stressor Controllability
B

T

p

Cumulative stress (Stress)

.65

9.65

.001

Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-

.02

0.31

.76

Stressor controllability (Control)

-.12

-1.55

.12

Stress x CRA-SCL

.05

0.76

.45

Stress x Control

-.13

-1.73

.09

CRA-SCL x Control

.13

1.57

.12

Stress x CRA-SCL x Control

.21

2.35

.02

SCL)

Note. R2 for the model = .45. B = Betas (standardized), n = 139
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Table 10
Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1
Cumulative Stress, Time 1 Stressor Controllability, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, Cognitive
Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SAD; changes in sadness), and Time 2 Stressor Controllability
B

T

p

Time 1 Depressive Symptoms

.49

6.95

.001

Time 1 Cumulative Stress (T1 Stress)

-.05

-0.57

.57

Time 1 Stressor Controllability

-.14

-2.38

.02

Time 2 Cumulative Stress (T2 Stress)

.49

7.17

.001

Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-

-.07

-1.33

.19

.03

0.36

.72

T2 Stress x CRA-SAD

-.07

-1.18

.24

T2 Stress x T2 Control

-.05

-0.74

.46

CRA-SAD x T2 Control

.05

0.84

.41

T2 Stress x CRA-SAD x T2 Control

.06

0.88

.38

SAD)
Time 2 Stressor controllability (T2
Control)

Note. R2 for the model = .71. B = Betas (standardized), n = 115
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Table 11
Time 2 Depressive Symptoms as Predicted by Time 1 Depressive Symptoms, Time 1
Cumulative Stress, Time 1 Stressor Controllability, Time 2 Cumulative Stress, Cognitive
Reappraisal Ability (CRA-SCL; changes in skin conductance level), and Time 2 Stressor
Controllability
B

T

p

Time 1 Depressive Symptoms

.54

7.17

.001

Time 1 Cumulative Stress

-.11

-1.28

.20

Time 1 Stressor Controllability

-.09

-1.41

.16

Time 2 Cumulative stress (T2 Stress)

.48

6.56

.001

Cognitive reappraisal ability (CRA-

-.01

-0.18

.86

-.03

-0.40

.69

T2 Stress x CRA-SCL

-.05

-0.82

.41

T2 Stress x T2 Control

-.12

-1.68

.10

CRA-SCL x T2 Control

-.11

-1.80

.08

T2 Stress x CRA-SCL x T2 Control

-.09

-1.36

.18

SCL)
Time 2 Stressor controllability (T2
Control)

Note. R2 for the model = .73. B = Betas (standardized), n = 103
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Appendix B
Figure 1. Schematic of procedures for measuring cognitive reappraisal ability. All
participants were randomly assigned to either Group 1 or Group 2. As shown below, the
only thing that differed between groups was the order of reappraisal instructions.

Group 1
Neutral Film

Sad Film 1
Fatal
Attraction

Sad Film 2
I Am Sam

Sad Film 3
Kramer vs
Kramer

Reappraisal

Group 2
Reappraisal
Neutral Film

Sad Film 1
Fatal
Attraction

Sad Film 2
I am Sam

Sad Film 3
Kramer vs
Kramer
Reappraisal

Emotion Self-Report

Physiological Measurement
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Z-Scored Sadness Rating (Baseline Corrected)

Figure 2. Sadness ratings (change from baseline sad film clip) during the cognitive
reappraisal task for each experimental group. The Y-axis represents the z-scored sadness
ratings during either Sad Film 2 or Sad Film 3, minus z-scored sadness ratings during the
baseline sad film (Film 1). Thus, more negative scores mean greater decrease in selfreported sadness relative to the baseline sad film. R’s indicate which experimental group
was instructed to use cognitive reappraisal during each film clip.

0.3
Group 1

0.2

Group 2

0.1
0
-0.1

R

R

-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6

99

Figure 3. The interaction of Time 2 cumulative stress and cognitive reappraisal ability
(CRA-SAD) on Time 2 depressive symptoms (BDI scores), controlling for Time 1
depressive symptoms and Time 1 cumulative stress. Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for
Time 2 cumulative stress and CRA-SAD. Error bars represent one standard error of the
mean.
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Figure 4. The three-way interaction of cumulative stress, cognitive reappraisal ability
(CRA-SAD), and stressor controllability on current depressive symptoms (BDI scores).
Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for cumulative stress, CRA-SAD, and stressor
controllability. Panel A depicts the interaction between cumulative stress and CRA-SAD
in the context of more uncontrollable stress. Panel B depicts the context of more
controllable stress. Error bars represent one standard error of the mean.
Panel A
35
30

BDI

25
20
15
10
5
0
Low Stress

High Stress

Panel B

35
30

BDI

25
20

Low CRASAD

15

High CRASAD

10
5
0
Low Stress

High Stress

101

Figure 5. The three-way interaction of cumulative stress, cognitive reappraisal ability
(CRA-SCL), and stressor controllability on current depressive symptoms (BDI scores).
Values depict estimates at ± 1 SD for cumulative stress, CRA-SCL, and stressor
controllability. Panel A depicts the interaction between cumulative stress and CRA-SCL
in the context of more uncontrollable stress. Panel B depicts the context of more
controllable stress. Error bars represent one standard of the mean.
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